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      In 1994 the Rwandan genocide stunned the international community. The 
brutality of its execution was incomprehensible and defied one’s wildest imagination. Many 
authors contend that ethnic extremism coupled with political manipulation were the primary 
factors behind this tragedy. Yet to oversimplify the cause of this tragedy makes one blind to 
the complicated nexus that generated the outcome. Even though this genocide was quick in 
its execution, the events that lead to this massacre took years to unfold. The first violent clash 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi began in 1959. Historically the relationship between Hutus 
and Tutsis was harmonious until the advent of Belgian colonialism, which imposed a system 
that benefited the Tutsi and victimized the Hutu. The Hutu disaffection with the system did 
not immediately translate into conflict. It was only when they were educated about their 
misfortunes and inequities that they rose up violently against the injustice. Unfortunately, 
they perpetrated a ghastly butchery of innocents. The nature of the Rwandan society where 
people lived close to each other, knew their neighbors very well, and had an element of blind 
obedience toward the authority served the agenda of the genocide perpetrators. These factors 
when compounded with intense competition for limited resources eventually led to the 
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 “An optimist will say that the glass is half full. A pessimist will say that the glass is 
half empty. A realist will say, ‘if I stay any longer, I will have to wash the glass.’” I believe 
that the third approach is more appropriate for any security builder or players for nation 
building. Departing from this standpoint, I decided to choose Rwanda as a case study for my 
thesis since it has some similarity with my country of origin. There had been a tension 
between the Malays and the Chinese since our independence from the British in 1957. The 
conflict peaked in 1969 when it cost numerous losses of lives. In the aftermath, the 
government pursued several policies that tried to address the inequality between the Malays 
and the Chinese. Whether this conflict has resolved in its totality depends on the 
interpretation of the beholder. When I study Rwanda, I found that the pattern is about the 
same, except that Rwanda took a violent turn for the worst. I humbly hope that my analysis 
and recommendation can be of benefit toward the effort of building a more tolerance society. 
 Although the analysis presented herein is my full responsibility, I am strongly 
indebted to Professor Robert McNab who guided and encouraged me in the course of writing 
this thesis. He assured me that I had selected a fine topic when I started to question my 
wisdom of selecting a case study on a country that was too alien for me. I am also indebted to 
Professor Robert E. Looney who offered his advice and encouragement for me to pursue this 
work. Professor Letitia Lawson taught me the problems and issues related to Africa and 
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for her contributions. With regard to the finishing touch of this thesis my appreciation goes to 
my editor, Ron Russell, who was very patient in helping to make my writing more readable 
to the audience.  
 I would never have come so far without the continuing support from my family. First 
and foremost are my parents, Hj. Mohamed Bin Samin and Hajjah Jamaliah Binti Hj. 
Hashim, who from the very beginning encouraged me to pursue the knowledge and stay 
steadfast in facing its challenges. They have  been the boulders of support on which I can 
always rely upon. My wife, Noreya Ibrahim, is the source of strength, optimism and 
encouragement in my life. Her care and patience helped me to finish this thesis within the 


























 In 1994, the Rwandan genocide caught the international community by surprise. The 
brutality of its execution was incomprehensible and defied international comprehension. 
Consequently it is a subject of interest for any security builder to understand the mechanism 
that drove a country such as Rwanda to experience such genocide. 
 Many authors contend that ethnic extremism and political manipulation ignited this 
tragedy. To over simplify the cause of this tragedy makes one blind to the nexus that 
generated the outcome. Even though this genocide was quick in its execution, one must 
understand that the events that led to this massacre took decades to unfold. The first violent 
clash between the Hutu and the Tutsi can be traced back to as early as 1959. 
 Historically, the relationship between Hutus and Tutsis was harmonious until the 
advent of Belgian colonialism, which imposed a system that benefited the small Tutsi 
population and victimized the majority Hutus. The Hutu disaffection with the system did not 
immediately translate into a conflict.  The conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis appeared 
when the Hutu gained access to higher education with the help of the Catholic church. The 
role of education, which itself is a major component of human capital, cannot be dismissed in 
analyzing the roots of this conflict. It is often only through education that people realize that 
they are victimized or have been denied the opportunity to prosper due to bigotry.  
 Hence, in the context of this thesis generating human capital entailed educating the 
people. This research illustrates that inequality in education and an educational system that 
demeans other people creates a boiling pot for racial prejudices. Moreover, the Rwandan 
genocide clearly shows even intellectuals and well-educated citizens can become mass 
murderers if their prejudices have been molded and reinforced since their early schooling. 
It is problematic to assert that resource scarcity only played a peripheral role in 
driving the Rwandan genocide. A pattern of preventing the refugees who dwelled in 
neighboring countries from returning, and apportioning the available jobs, university 
placements and secondary schooling along ethnic lines proved that competition for the 
meager resources was indeed a major factor behind the tragedy. 
 The social cohesiveness between the perpetrators of the genocide perverted the  social 
capital. The mechanics of the genocide demanded that almost all Hutus within Rwanda take 
 xvi 
part in the campaign, focusing on the aim of eliminating the Tutsis. The research presented in 
this thesis will explain the interplay between the three variables in generating the Rwandan 
conflict. The lesson can be a valuable tool for security builders to assess similar situations 
elsewhere. With this assessment, hopefully good policy tools can be implemented to stem 

























On 19 February 2003, a church leader and his son, a medical doctor, were found 
guilty of aiding and instigating genocide in Rwanda. The verdict of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda based in Arusha, Tanzania, was unanimous. The pastor, 
then president of the Seventh Day Adventist Church in western Rwanda, and his son, 
who was working at the hospital adjacent to the church, were accused of luring Tutsis 
who sought refuge into the church complex before personally leading in Hutu militias to 
massacre them.1 
The father and son were not the only ones guilty of the massacres.  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established to try those suspected of 
masterminding the 1994 genocide. The rest of the perpetrators, that is, those accused of 
killings, being accomplices to genocide, or looting will be tried in the Rwandan 
traditional court, known as the Gacaca. There are more than 85,000 suspects being held 
in overcrowded and unsanitary jails in Rwanda.2  
The genocide perpetrators came from all levels of society. 3 It is difficult to arrive 
at an accurate figure of the proportion of Rwanda’s Hutu who participated in the 
genocide. Perhaps as many people killed as were killed. Why did those hundred 
thousands of Hutu citizens join with their government to kill their Tutsi neighbors, their 
Tutsi wives, their Tutsi students, their Tutsi patients and fellow Hutu thought to be Tutsi 
collaborators? 
The Rwandan genocide, which started on the night of April 6, 1994 and ended on 
July 19, 1994, defies logic and imagination. The speed and brutality of the killings, 
considering that most of the weapons used were primitive (machetes, swords, spears and 
the traditional masu4) surpassed that of the Nazis in the execution of Holocaust or the 
                                                 
 1 Reported by The Financial Times Limited (London) on February 20,2003. 
 2 Reported by The Agence France-Presse on  August 23, 2003. 
 3 Those charged included a vice-rector of a university, professors, teachers, businessmen, farmers, 
soldiers, doctors, church workers, and so on. 
 4 A large club studded with nails. 
2 
Khmer Rouge in their Killing Fields.5 In about one hundred days, approximately eight 
hundred and fifty thousands individuals were murdered, a rate of murder of 333.3 deaths 
per hour or 5.5 deaths per minute.6 While the general motive of the Nazi may have been 
the elimination of “inferior races” or anti-Semitism and the Khmer Rouge was the 
elimination of bourgeoisie and other “capitalist” classes, the motive behind the genocide7 
in Rwanda is harder to decipher.  
I believe that the conflict in Rwanda is unique and demands further analysis to 
prevent future conflicts. The conflict’s uniqueness stems from several factors. First, the 
conflict moved from a latent to a protracted conflict before exploding into genocide. In 
fact, it did not fully attract international interest until it grew into a genocidal conflict. 
Ironically the genocide happened during the presence of the United Nation peacekeeping 
force, that is, the United Nation Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). In lieu of 
the failure of the United Nations to adopt a positive action to halt the genocide, an 
independent panel of inquiry was commissioned by the Secretary General with the 
approval of the Security Council to investigate those actions. In conclusion, the panel 
found that the international community made a judgmental error in assessing the events 
in Rwanda and lacked the political will and commitment of resources to prevent the 
genocide. Hence it remains a challenge for a security builder to arrive at an accurate 
assessment of the actual cause of the conflict and apply the knowledge to prevent similar 
occurrences in the future. 
Second, the conflict displayed how discriminatory policies with respect to how 
the accumulation of human capital served as the basis for the fragmentation of the 
Rwandan society. Inequalities manifested themselves through the education system, 
administrative jobs and economic opportunities. The colonial powers (the Germans 
followed by the Belgians) used the Tutsis as administrators and oppressed the Hutu 
                                                 
 5 Alan J. Kupperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Mechanics of Genocide (The 
Brookings Institution, 2001) 15. 
 6 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Cornell University 
Press, 2002) 1. 
 7 It is not the intention of this paper to discuss the relevancy of the genocide terminology in the 
Rwandan massacre considering that many Hutu and Twa were also among the victims. Genocide 
terminology is used in this paper considering the huge number of victims and the largest proportion came 
from the Tutsi group. 
3 
population. The Tutsi were invested with power and privilege; educated, trained, and then 
subcontracted to do the dirty work on behalf of the colonial power. These policies caused 
the Hutu population to resent the Tutsi. The missionaries who had previously 
championed education for the Tutsi exacerbated the situation when they reversed their 
policy and started to educate the Hutu.  Simultaneously, the missionaries blamed the 
Tutsi for the injustices suffered by the Hutu. Rwanda can be considered as one of the 
classic examples of the destructive legacies of the indirect rule. 
Third, the Rwandan genocide displays the grave implication of scarce resources 
within a conflict-prone society. Rwanda is the most densely populated country on the 
African continent. With a population growth rate of 3.2%, each square kilometer of 
arable land had to support an average of over four hundred people in 1991.8 Since the 
majority of local people lived in rural areas, land pressure and landlessness were severe 
problems. This problem was enflamed by the incursion of large numbers of Hutu 
refugees from Burundi in 1993. Rwanda’s economy collapsed in 1986 with the collapse 
of the prices of coffee and tin, Rwanda’s primary exports. The Rwandan government 
requested International Monetary Fund assistance, which required adherence to a 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The Rwandan SAP involved a currency 
devaluation and reduction in public spending through privatization. 9 The fall in the price 
of coffee adversely affected the peasants’ income. Additionally, privatization created a 
loss of access to free health care, free schooling and other services that the government 
had subsidized. Combined with the invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) form 
the North in 1990, these developments resulted in a rapid decline in food production. 
Internal and external displacement also occurred, further exacerbating poverty.   
Finally, the genocide devastated Rwandan social capital, destroying the norms, 
values and trust that bond communities together. The execution of the genocide was 
                                                 
 8 John F. May, “Policies on Population, Land Use, and Environment in Rwanda,” paper presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Cincinnati, Ohio, 3 April 1993, citing from 
ONAPO/FNUAP/DTCD, Monographie demographique prefectorale, La population de Butare en chiffres, 
Kigali: Office National de la Population et Projet Assistance a l’ONAPO RWA/87/PO3 FNUAP/DTCD, 
1991, 2-3. 
 9 Steve Utterwulghe, “Rwanda’s Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in 
Conflict Resolution Strategies,” The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue August 1999: 
2.3, accessed electronically on 07 May 2003, <http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/> 
4 
efficient due to a strong social cohesiveness that emerged within Hutu extremism. 
Vertical social cohesiveness was evident by the response of the Hutu masses to the call 
from the government to participate in the genocide.  The success was coupled by the 
ability of the state to provide excellent information networks, and it instilled a sense of 
solidarity, obligation and civic duty in the midst of Hutu’s fear towards the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front’s (RPF) invasion. Their fears were justified since thousands had died and 
hundreds of thousands of people had lost their land, houses and possessions in their flight 
from the RPF.10 The assassination of a democratically elected Hutu president in 
neighboring Burundi by the Tutsi-controlled army officers and subsequent massacres also 
aggravated the Hutu’s fear.11 Thousands of other Hutu had the same experiences in 
neighboring Burundi. Every Hutu who subscribed to the state’s propaganda would have 
thought that he or she was in a potential struggle for survival. Horizontally, the Hutu 
were strongly united in fighting their perceived common enemy.  
 
B. THESIS 
This thesis examines the role of human capital, resource scarcity and social 
cohesion on the formation and execution of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. While many 
other variables contributed to the conflict, the impact of the variables examined in this 
thesis are of profound importance if one hopes to understand the Rwandan conflict. 
Understanding the role of these variables is necessary to develop strategies for post-
conflict reconstruction.    
This thesis argues that resource scarcity created the potential for conflict, human 
capital formation determined the shape that the conflict was likely to take (ethnic rather 
than class or political), and social cohesion patterns facilitated the “effectiveness” of the 
genocide campaign once it started.  These variables and their implications go beyond 
Rwanda. Throughout developing countries, ethnic and racial issues remain at the 
forefront of government agendas. Globally, people are fighting each other over limited 
resources. Consequently there is a tendency to allocate opportunities for higher education 
                                                 
 10 John Pender, “The Genocide Framework,” paper presented at the Africa Direct Conference, 
London, 27 July 1997.  
 11 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995) 199. 
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and job placements within governmental administrations and the private sector on the 
basis of ethnicity or racial characteristics. The intensity of the issues differs from one 
country to another but Rwanda illustrated that a disastrous outcome can ensue if those 
with the monopoly of violence manipulated the issues to suit their cliques. 
Many of these developing countries are recipients of foreign aid and some of 
them are considered as development models.12 Consequently, policy makers must gather 
and analyze information to assess trends within their country so that development aid 
does not interact with processes that carry a profound risk of violence. 
 
C. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
Chapter II presents the historical context of Rwanda from the pre-colonial period 
until the current post-genocide situation in which the Rwandan government is still 
fighting the remnants of the genocide perpetrators at its border with Congo. In order to 
understand the antagonism between the Hutus and the Tutsis, one needs to delve into 
Rwanda’s turbulent history. Suffice it to say that the variables involved in this analysis 
are firmly rooted in the Rwandan colonial period. 
Chapter III examines the accumulation of human capital in Rwanda in its pre-
independence and post- independence eras. Human capital played a role in this conflict 
through the relationship between the attainment of the education and likelihood of 
conflict. First, inequalities in educational opportunities generated an insufficient amount 
of human capital. The inequalities in human capital served as a basis for hatred, 
bitterness, and resentment. Moreover, it is worth noting that the intellectuals were not 
immune from collaborating with extremist forces in propagating the genocidal agenda. 
What was taught and the context within which it was taught are just as important if not 
more important than educational inequalities. Second, the lack of educational 
opportunities, regardless of ethnicity, meant that many Rwandans could not escape the 
rural, agriculture based society. These factors, combined with the increasing scarcity of 
arable land produce an intense struggle for survival.  
Chapter IV examines the political and social implications of environmental 
resource scarcity in generating conflicts. The Malthusian debate is discussed with respect 
                                                 
 12 Rwanda itself was considered as a development model prior to 1986. 
6 
to the situation in Rwanda because land pressure is an issue in agriculturalist societies. 
This issue played a role in the conflict, and consequently it is important to channel 
developmental aid in such a way that it will mitigate the effects. 
Chapter V examines the perversion of social capital, that is, the manipulation of 
social cohesion to serve the interest of the extremist in executing the genocide. Some 
argue that a centralized, top-down, rigid control of the population in developing countries 
is necessary in order to achieve a high rate of development. Singapore is always quoted 
as a successful model of this approach. How long it will remain successful is yet to be 
noted, but Rwanda is an example of a disastrous failure of this model. 13   
Chapter VI concludes the overall analysis and offers recommendation for 
preventing future genocide and reshaping a post conflict environment. It is imperative for 
a post-conflict society to address the three variables as soon as possible to break the chain 
that can cycle them back into another conflict. This can be implemented by reforming 
education policy, creating interdependencies among the actors in accessing scarce 
resources, generating diversified income resources, and fostering associations across 
groups through community projects, and intermixing of groups in schools and businesses. 
By building a sustainable social capital, a more viable state can be reconstructed from the 










                                                 
 13 Another example is the Soviet Union. 
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II. THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the history of Rwanda from the pre-colonial period to 
present. The historical record is presented in order to arrive at a complete understanding 
of the antagonism between the indigenous actors in Rwanda. I argue that the conflict was 
deeply rooted in the historical interpretation of the origin of the Tutsis and the Hutus.  
The act of genocide against the Tutsis received almost widespread support from 
the Hutus within Rwanda since the organizers of the genocide had successfully exploited 
misconceptions about who the Tutsis were, what they had done in the past, and what they 
would do in the future.14 These misconceptions had been fostered through many years of 
government propaganda and distortions of history taught in the schools.15 With the Tutsi 
dominated rebels force at the border, the majority of Hutus populace may have believed 
the distorted history. In undertaking this task, I divide the history of Rwanda into three 
parts: the pre-conflict period, the conflict period and the post-conflict period. 
 
B. PRE-CONFLICT PERIOD 
Rwanda, which means “a land of a thousand hills,” is located just south of the 
equator in the east-central Africa. Its first inhabitants were the Twa, a small group of 
pygmoid hunter and gatherers. In the fourth or fifth century the Hutu emigrated from 
Central Africa and settled in Rwanda as farmers. The Tutsi were said to arrive in 
successive waves from the north during the 15th and 16th centuries. They were cattle 
herders and most likely came from Ethiopia. The population of Rwanda in 1926 was 1% 
Twa, 84% Hutu, and 15% Tutsi16.  Since the Tutsi were wealthy and had superior skills 
as warriors, they were able to establish a monarchy to rule over Rwanda. The king was 
                                                 
 14 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995) 353-354. See also Rene Lemarchand, “Managing transition Anarchies: Rwanda, Burundi, and South 
Africa in Comparative Perspective,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 32.4  (1994): 589-590. 
 15 Christian P. Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence and 
Regional War (Connecticut: Praeger Publisher, 2002) 72 
 16 Allison Des Forges, Leave None To Tell the Story: The Transformation of “Hutu” and “Tutsi”  
(New York: Human Right Watch, 1999) 4.  The first recorded census was taken when the Belgian 
implemented ethnic identity cards, which demanded each Rwandan declare himself or herself as Hutu, 
Tutsi or Twa. Basically the composition is the same today as it has been for centuries. 
8 
known as Mwami and the populace considered themselves as Banyarwandans, or 
inhabitants of the kingdom of Rwanda. They lived intermingled with one another, 
belonged to joint clans, spoke the same Kinyarwandan language, and shared the same 
culture. Intermarriage was common.  
 
Figure 1: Position of Rwanda with respect to Africa 
 
Other than the fact that some Tutsis and few Hutus were members of the wealthy 
elite and close to the Mwami, the rest of the Banyarwandans, Hutu and Tutsi alike, were 
simply poor peasants struggling to survive from one year to the next.  
The kingdom was structured in such a way that under the Mwami there were three 
types of chiefs: “chief of the landholding,” “chief of men,” and “chief of pastures.” The 
chiefs were Tutsi and Hutu and there was a mechanism in which each household within 
the village made its own arrangements to pay the tax to the government. The system was 
not exploitative since it was in the form of collective responsibility. Against this setting, 
Rwanda was colonized first by the Germans and later on by the Belgians.  
9 
C. CONFLICT PERIOD 
In the late 1880s Rwanda was claimed by the Germans, the Belgians and the 
British. The Germans had the priority of the claim since Count von Gotzen, then 
Governor of German East Africa, had signed a treaty with Kigeri V Rwabugiri, the 
Rwandan Mwami after Gotzen explored the area. The contentious issue between the 
colonial powers was settled in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 when most of 
Rwanda was awarded to the Germans. 
Apart from settling the conflicting claims, the Berlin Conference also established 
the ground rules for colonialism. These rules included a requirement for the colonial 
power to demonstrate that they were effectively occupying the respective lands and 
establishing a civilizing mission into the area. Consequently apart from stationing their 
agents and soldiers in the occupied lands the colonial powers also brought in the 
missionaries to conduct the task of “civilizing” the indigenous inhabitants. The Catholic 
missionaries established their mission and schools in 1903. They were not well accepted 
by Mwami Musinga (descendant of Mwami Rwabugiri) and only succeeded after the 
Germans pressured Musinga. As a result, Christianity spread very slowly and attracted 
only the poor and marginal people who looked to the church for some material incentives 
and opportunities for paid employment.17  
The German colonial presence was very limited but began to transform relations 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Since the number of Germans who lived in Rwanda was 
insignificant, they chose to administer the colony indirectly through the Mwami. 18 It is 
worth noting that Mwami Musinga had no wish to be seen as a Tutsi until he was 
overthrown in 1931.19 The military hierarchy and the administration chiefs answerable to 
the Mwami continued to be Hutus and Tutsis. Thus the relations between Hutu and Tutsi 
were bound by a shared loyalty to a common institution. 20  
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With the defeat of the Germans in World War I, the League of Nations mandated 
Belgium to administer Rwanda. The Belgians were impressed by the highly ordered 
social structure they found in Rwanda and believed that continuing the German policy of 
indirect rule was the best way to administer the country. 21 They, however, found that 
Rwanda’s complexities troublesome. The administration within central Rwanda, 
including the least important representatives of the Mwami who sometimes governed 
only a few hundred people, necessitated a relatively high proportion of labor and local 
goods for its support.22  Unfortunately, the Belgian ruling class was not willing to make 
the effort dealing with the “intertwined fingers” of Rwandese Tutsi-Hutu relations. For 
the Belgians, it was much easier to divide society between Hutus and Tutsis and ally one 
group against the rest.23 The previous system of having three chiefs for each area, one at 
least of whom was normally a Hutu, was replaced by having a single chief for every 
locality. 24 The Belgians rammed through a series of measures that utterly transformed the 
social structure. Mwami Musinga was the last of Rwanda’s Mwami who explicitly 
exhibited an anti-colonialism attitude. He was brought down by the Belgian governor 
Tilkens in 1931 and replaced with his son, Rudahigwa, who had been educated at a 
missionary school. 25 From this point on, the Mwami were described as Tutsi.  
The indigenous pre-colonial patron/client relationship (ubuhake) that was flexible 
and contained an important element of reciprocity was rigidified by the Belgians and 
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devoid of mutual obligation. Traditionally, ubuhake was a relationship based on a 
measure of reciprocity; through such ties, the client gained a certain level of protection 
and even prestige through his patron. Prunier notes that ubuhake had taken several forms: 
First, it was a link of subordination between “high and low” Tutsi lineages. Second, it 
was used as initiatives to increase control over their “administrative” subordinates, 
whether Tutsi or Hutu. Third, ubuhake became defensive strategies by either Hutu or 
Tutsi lineages who owned cattle and felt threatened by an encroaching rich Tutsi lineage 
and who looked for powerful shebuja (patron) to protect them. Finally, poor families 
Tutsi or even Hutu, who looked for a patron in order to improve a particular sorry 
economic situation, also used ubuhake as survival strategies. Ubuhake was then closed to 
charity.26 Under the Belgian administration, ubuhake became simply another form of 
exploitation.  
The policy that institutionalized Tutsi supremacy greatly enlarged the power of 
Tutsi chiefs at the local level. Hutu chiefs were replaced with Tutsi appointed by the 
administration. These chiefs were now responsible for meeting the demands of the 
colonial state, which included the collection of head taxes, providing men for free labor 
in building roads and other public works projects.27 In the course of discharging their 
official duties, the chiefs, their kinsmen, and their clients would use their power over the 
common people to enrich themselves, and understandably the abuses fell hardest on those 
unable to escape.28 
Simultaneous with the Belgian policy of favoring the Tutsi to fill the 
administrative posts, the Catholic schools, which represented the dominant educational 
system throughout the colonial period, adjusted their educational policies and openly 
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28 Lee Ann Fujii, “Origin of Power and Identity in Rwanda,” paper presented at the Annual 
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favored Tutsi and discriminated against Hutu.29 The Catholic missionaries purposely 
reinforced the Tutsi feeling of superiority since the missionaries believed tha t the Tutsi 
were the “natural-born chief.” Therefore they were given priority in education so that the 
church would have an influence over the future ruling class.30 The majority Hutu 
population was left with no choice in pursuing the education except to become theology 
students at the seminaries. They faced difficulties in finding employment upon graduation 
and this led to frustration and embitterment in the long run. 31  
Once the Belgians had decided to limit opportunities for higher education and 
selection for the administration posts to the Tutsi, they were faced with the challenge of 
distinguishing between the Tutsis, the Hutus and the Twas. Eventually they created a 
procedure of registering everyone according to their affiliated group. The information 
obtained was recorded at the offices of the local government and each Rwandan was 
issued with an identity card that indicated his or her ethnicity. 32 
The segregation between the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa was firmly implanted with the 
introduction of this ethnic identity card in 1933. This identity card resembled a solid 
fence between the three groups that could no longer be crossed or reversed. The issuance 
of this identity card to all Rwandans eliminated the “fluid movement between castes and 
permanently fixing the identity of each individual, and his or her children, as either Hutu 
or Tutsi.”33 The long-term effect of this policy was more damaging, since it was 
maintained and manipulated to the best interest of the ruling party. 34 Consequently, the 
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segregation policy that was introduced by the Belgium with the sole purpose of favoring 
Tutsi and exploiting them for indirect rule firmly sowed the seed of hatred of Hutu 
toward Tutsi. If before the segregation “the oppressors” were the administrators, now the 
oppressed Hutu regarded the Tutsi as the enemy. 
In the mid 1950s, the educated Tutsi began to embrace ideas of decolonization 
that were spreading across Africa and demanded independence. This certainly angered 
the Belgians who understood that their interests were no longer being served by the Tutsi. 
In retribution, Belgium began to switch its preference toward the majority Hutu. 35 
Coincidentally, the international community through the United Nations had criticized 
Belgium for their discriminatory colonial activities. By giving the political field to the 
Hutu, the Belgians managed to address both problems simultaneously. The Catholic 
Church whose objective was to influence the Rwandan government started to sponsor 
Hutus to generate educated Hutus. The increased calls for emancipation of the working 
class and the growth of trade unionism in Europe also influenced the missionaries to 
revise their policy toward the treatment of the Hutus.36 Thus they felt they had the moral 
duty to protest the social injustices suffered by the Hutus and set about to redesign their 
approach to sympathize the Hutu cause.37 
With the support and blessing of their colonial master and the Catholic church, the 
educated Hutu organized their pro-colonial interest groups that were quickly transformed 
into the first ethno political movements.38 Gregoire Kayibanda created the Hutu Social 
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Movement (MSM) in June 1957 and Joseph Gitera formed the “Association for the 
Social Promotion of the Masses” (APROSOMA) in November 1957.39 
In response, members of the Tutsi elites organized themselves into the Rwandese 
National Union (UNAR), which was hostile to Belgium and pressed for independence. 
Realizing that the Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs with whom the Belgians had collaborated 
with for many years started to show hostility toward the Belgian, Jean-Paul Harroy who 
was the last Belgian Governor General, embarked on a reform that replaced many Tutsi 
chiefs and sub-chiefs with Hutu with the pretext of advancing democracy and acting in 
the welfare of the oppressed majority. 40 To counter the UNAR demands, the Belgium 
also sponsored a liberal and multi-ethic political party known as the Rwandese 
Democratic Union (RADER), but it attracted few supporters since the situation at the 
time had been extremely polarized by the distinction between the Hutu and Tutsi 
groups.41  
The tension became so intense by late 1959 that violence erupted when some 
young members of the UNAR attacked a Hutu sub-chief who was also a PARMEHUTU 
(offspring of the MSM party) activist on 1 November 1959. The false news of his death 
provoked reprisals against the Tutsis and particularly toward the UNAR members. Hutu 
activists gathered their troops and attacked the Tutsis, burned their houses, and stole their 
cattle. The attack occurred throughout Rwanda, particularly in the Northern part where 
Tutsi domination was deeply resented.42 The calamities claimed thousands of Tutsis and 
tens of thousand became refugees in neighboring countries.43 Since the outbreak of the 
violence, the Belgian authorities understandably showed extreme partiality for the Hutus 
and did not intervene forcefully to stop the Hutus from burning the Tutsis’ houses.44 
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Finally, they did intervene to restore order but after much damage had been done and the 
Belgian authority itself started to lose control of the situation. 
The destructive development that spanned from 1959 to 1961 came to be known 
as the Hutu revolution and led to the abolition of the monarchy and the removal of all 
political administrative Tutsi structures. The Hutu revolution firmly placed Rwanda in a 
conflict trap. Considering the number of Tutsis either killed or forced from their homes 
and the extreme damage in general, it was understandable that they would fight back at 
the earliest opportunity. 
The transition from Tutsi to Hutu political domination was sealed by a United 
Nation sponsored election on September 25, 1961, which resulted in a definitive victory 
for the Hutu parties.45 PARMEHUTU gained thirty-five seats out of forty-four while 
UNAR only won seven seats.46 Gregoire Kayibanda was elected as the President and 
Rwanda became formally independent on July 1, 1962. 
Kayibanda was to rule Rwanda in an authoritarian way until 1973. For the first 
several years of his term in office, armed Tutsi refugee groups organized raids into 
Rwanda from the borders of Burundi, Zaire and Tanzania. Each raid provoked severe 
reprisals against Tutsi still living in Rwanda. Thousands were either killed or fled into 
exile.47 In 1963 the Tutsi rebels (called Inyenzi or cockroaches by Hutu authorities) 
launched an invasion that came quite close to the capital of Kigali but was beaten back by 
the Kayibanda government. Unfortunately, the government seized this opportunity to 
justify a massive reprisal against the Tutsis. It was estimated that nearly 10,000 Tutsis 
were slaughtered from December 1963 to January 1964 including every single Tutsi 
politician living in Rwanda.48 This event did not attract international reaction, except 
from the Swiss government (a major foreign donor), which asked for a commission of 
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inquiry.49 The inquiry issued a report that placed the blame on the rebels, labeling the 
events as Inyenzi terrorism in Rwanda.50 The government’s activity during the crisis was 
whitewashed and so Swiss economic cooperation was unaffected.51 
Using the pretext of Inyenzi threats, Kayibanda was able to exploit the lingering 
fear of Tutsi for his own political objectives. When his regime was criticized for favoring 
the southern over northern Hutus in the early 1970s, he used the anti-Tutsi agenda to 
deflect the  issue.52 His agents accused Tutsi of holding a disproportionate number of jobs 
in the private sector, in the schools, and in the church hierarchy. As a result the Tutsis 
were harassed and fired from their jobs and Tutsi school pupils were abused. A general 
state of unrest spread throughout the country and with the killings of Tutsis, streams of 
refugees flocked again across the neighboring borders. The Kayibanda strategy 
eventually backfired when the situation exploded out of control, which provided an 
opportunity for Kayibanda’s Defense Minister, Juvenal Habyarimana, to stage a coup 
d’etat on the pretext of trying to reestablished order.53 Under Habyarimana, the 
persecution of Tutsi was brought to an end and a policy of regional and ethnic 
equilibrium was designed to allocate the opportunity for state administrative jobs, 
schooling and university placements on the basis of the representation of the population. 
Hutus would not be favored over the Tutsis, neither the southerners over the northerners. 
Even though in practice, the Tutsis were still being discriminated against, they were no 
longer being killed or harassed.54  
In 1978, Habyarimana institutionalized a one-party system in order to strengthen 
his power base.55 This party, known as Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le 
Developpement (MRND) was a totalitarian party of which every Rwandan including 
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babies and the elderly had to be members.56  Practically, Habyarimana extended his 
control to the lowest level of the populace.  
Rwanda had been performing well economically for 12 years under his regime 
and the external political affiliation shifted toward France since it offered financial and 
military guarantees, which Belgium could not provide.57 Unfortunately, in 1986, Rwanda 
was hit by an economic crisis in which the prices of its two main exports, coffee and tin, 
crashed on the world market. A ravaging famine that ensued in 1988 severely weakened 
the legitimacy of Habyarimana government due to its failure to address the situation 
successfully. The Habyarimana government also failed to seek a solution for the Tutsi 
refuges that were numbering in the hundreds of thousands living in neighboring countries 
and demanding to return. 58 He firmly objected to the return of the refugees, charging that 
Rwanda was overpopulated. 
Eventually in 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which consisted mainly 
of former Tutsi soldiers serving in the Ugandan army, seized the opportunity provided by 
the unstable situation to launch an invasion from the north. With the French’s assistance, 
the government forces managed to stop the RPF’s advancement and push them back 
toward the northern border.59  
Owing to political and economic deterioration, caused several opposition groups 
within Rwanda voiced their anger. Even though Habyarimana had always enforced the 
MRND political monopoly, eventually he succumbed to the idea of a multiparty system 
when advised by President Mitterrand.60 When the political reform was implemented in 
1991, twelve new political parties were established.61 Habyarimana’s party changed its 
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name to MRNDD, and the four main opposition parties were the Democratic Republican 
Movement (MDR), Social Democratic Party (PSD), Liberal Party (PL) and Christian 
Democratic Party (PDC).62 The other seven smaller parties were instigated by 
Habyarimana as an attempt to make a mockery of multipartyism.63 These seven smaller 
parties were not very active and were manipulated by Habyarimana to serve MRNDD 
purposes.64  
To address the economic situation, in 1991 Rwanda signed a $90 million 
structural adjustment program (SAP) with the World Bank after long and difficult 
negotiations.65 To boost coffee exports and to reduce imports, the SAP called for the 
devaluation of the Rwandese franc by 55 percent in 1992.66 The devaluation could not 
compensate for the further decline of the coffee price and at the same time increased 
inflation. 67 Even though the SAP mandated many actions that the government had to 
pursue in order to promote fiscal discipline, the government implemented few of them, 
which were the devaluation of Rwandese francs and temporarily halting the expansion of 
public sector jobs.68 Public employment was greatly expanded when the government 
decided to increase the size of the army.69  
Subsequent RPF attacks prompted the international community to broker a 
ceasefire between the government forces and the RPF. The Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) led by Tanzanian president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, was to play a major role by 
being the mediator between the two belligerents.70 For the four main opposition parties, 
the RPF served to increase their leverage and bargaining power relative to the 
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MRNDD.71 On the other hand political liberalization and forced negotiation with the RPF 
pressured Habyarimana and his political circle to salvage the remaining power they had. 
Subsequently, this led to the formation of the Hutu extremist CDR (Coalition pour la 
Defense de la Republique) party in January 1993.72 In order to undermine the 
peacemaking process, the CDR and MRNDD supervised the murders of political 
opponents and increased violence against Tutsi populace.73 With the deteriorating 
situation, the donor nations, including the World Bank, threatened Habyarimana that 
financial assistance would be halted if he did not sign a treaty with the RPF by August 9, 
1993.74 Sensing that the government coffer was close to empty due to the economic 
recession and the military expenditure on the war, Habyarimana was obliged to sign the 
peace agreement on August 4, 1993 at Arusha, Tanzania.75 
In essence, the Arusha Accord consists of two protocols. First, it covered the 
integration of the armed forces of the government and the RPF. Second, it dealt with 
various other issues including human rights violations, rule of law, power sharing, and 
transitional institution, resettlement of displaced persons and reparation for refugees. A 
timetable was drawn up for a projected period of two months in which a broad-based 
transitional government (BBTG) had to be established by the thirty-seventh day after the 
signing of the agreement (September 10, 1993) and end with a fair and free election. 76 
On the surface, the parties to the negotiations seemed to be successful in paving a 
way for a stable Rwanda, but “underneath they were quite fearful of the future because 
the extremists were venomously opposed to the accords.”77 Rene Lemarchand also noted 
that the Arusha Accord as a recipe for disaster since it was viewed by the Hutu extremist 
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as an agreement that was imposed on them by outsiders.78 The only real achievement of 
the Arusha accords was the ability of the international mediators to persuade all the 
parties involved “to put their signatures” on a piece of paper.79 According to Prunier, 
Habyarimana himself signed the agreement as “a tactical move calculated to buy time, 
shore up the contradictions of the various segments of the opposition and [to] look good 
in the eyes of the foreign donors.”80 
Against these settings, the United Nation (UN) deployed its peacekeepers, the 
United Nation Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in implementing the 
Arusha agreement and support the BBTG according to the mandate passed by the 
Security Council. Based on the findings of the UN reconnaissance Mission to Rwanda, 
which was part of UNOMUR, Boutros Ghali proposed a force of 2,548 peacekeepers, 
plus various military, civilian and police personnel to undertake the tasks of UNAMIR. 81 
The UNAMIR troops were plagued with the same problems that were faced by “virtually 
all peacekeeping operations, [that is], a lack of trained personnel, equipment, and 
finances.”82 As Laegreid contends, “The Rwanda operation was in this matter not a 
unique case, but the limitation would have devastating consequences when the crisis 
erupted in early April.”83 
On the other hand, the United States, which bore a large amount of the UN 
peacekeeping costs was in the process of reviewing its policy on supporting peacekeeping 
missions. The United States had suffered 370 percent increase in peacekeeping expenses 
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from 1992 to 1993.84 The United States was determined to keep the cost of UNAMIR as 
low as possible.85 The UNAMIR budget was only approved on April 4, 1994, and this 
delay coupled with low funding, prevented UNAMIR being equipped with enough 
ammunition and armored personnel carriers (APC) when the genocide began on April 6, 
1994.86 
Brigadier General Romeo Dellaire, who had been the UNOMUR’s commander, 
was tapped to lead UNAMIR under the Secretary General Special Representative, 
Jacques Booh-Booh from Cameroon. Dallaire arrived in Kigali on October 22, followed 
by Booh-Booh a few weeks later. The Belgian and Bangladeshi forces that comprised the 
Kigali battalion arrived in the first week of December, and by December 28, the force 
had accumulated only 1,260 personnel from a dozen different countries.87  
The deployment of UNAMIR was structured into four phases. Phase I began with 
the departure of foreign forces and the mission objective was to establish a secure 
environment within which a broad-based transitional government (BBTG) would be 
established. Once the BBTG was installed, UNAMIR would move into Phase II that 
called for the preparation for disengagement, demobilization, and integration of former 
belligerents. In Phase III, the objective to disengage, demobilize and integrate the former 
belligerents. In the final phase, the objective was to normalize the situation and 
subsequently to withdraw the UNAMIR upon the completion of the elections. 
Phase I was completed successfully by UNAMIR, including the additional task of 
establishing an operation area in Southern Rwanda to mitigate the effect caused by the 
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influx of refugees who fled Burundi due to ethnic violence.88 Unfortunately, 
Habyarimana kept delaying the formation of the BBTG by challenging the interpretation 
of the Arusha Accords. 
In the meantime Hutu extremists began their preparation for the genocide. At the 
end of 1993, Minister Felicien Gatabazi sent a letter to Dallaire warning him that a 
dangerous conflict was brewing within Rwanda.89 He insisted that Dallaire should 
request new operational rules from UN headquarters that would allow UNAMIR 
personnel to intervene to stop massacres.90 Dallaire also received letters from senior 
officers of the Rwandan Armed Forces drawing his attention to the increased incidence of 
violence that was planned to incite the RPF to violate the cease-fire that would then 
justify the general resumption of hostilities.91 Adding to this background the extremist’s 
radio station (RTLM) had been broadcasting daily calls to violence against Tutsis and 
dissidents.92 At this stage, “Dallaire and other UNAMIR officials were now keenly aware 
that they were supervising a highly explosive situation.”93 Dallaire’s requests to UN 
headquarters for more troops and a broader interpretation of UNAMIR’s mandate to 
tailor the situation were repeatedly refused.94  
Jean-Pierre Twatzinze, who had personal ties to the palace and involved in 
training the Interahamwe, delivered the most detailed warning to Dallaire on January 
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11.95 According to him, the Hutu elites had been busy planning to exterminate all Tutsis 
and transforming the Interahamwe into a killing machine. Weapons had been stockpiled 
and ethnic cleansing would begin once the BBTG was established. Calculating that the 
Interahamwe would not be able to fight a two-front war with the RPF and the UN, they 
were planning to kill several Belgian peacekeepers, which they assessed would cause 
Belgium to withdraw their troops (A lesson learned from observing Somalia). He offered 
to take UNAMIR to the weapon cache and promised to supply more information if the 
UN could guarantee a protection for himself, his wife and four children. 96 
In response, Dallaire sent a cable to his superior at the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operation’s (DPKO) in New York detailing the information that he 
received. He stated that he planned to seize the arms within thirty-six hours and requested 
protection for Jean Pierre. He concluded the cable by saying “Where there is a will, there 
is a way. Let’s do it.”97 Unfortunately, DPKO responded by stating that UNAMIR’s 
mandate did not permit such action and directed Dallaire to discuss the information with 
Habyarimana. Furthermore protection for Jean-Pierre could not be offered.98 
The effect was damaging. After the meeting with Habyarimana, Dallaire 
concluded, “The president and officials of his political party were bewildered by the 
specificity of the information at our disposal. The president of MRNDD seemed 
unnerved and is reported to have subsequently ordered an accelerated distribution of 
weapons.”99 
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While Dallaire repeatedly requested a more flexible mandate, the Secretary 
General repeatedly “underlined that the success of the mission depended on the 
cooperation of the Rwandese parties and their willingness to implement the Arusha 
Agreement.”100 Furthermore, the DPKO viewed Dallaire’s plan as an attempt to repeat 
UNOSOM’s failure, and “they feared that the Interahamwe would give an Aideed- like 
response to a UNOSOM-like provocation.”101  
The genocide began in the evening of April 6, 1994, after the aircraft that carried 
Habyarimana and Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down while on 
approach into the Kigali airport. Immediately the extremist set into action, killing 
individuals who were high on their hit lists. During the first phase of the slaughter, 
prominent opposition politicians, human right activists, lawyers, critical journalists and 
moderate civil servants were targeted.102 “Hours after the plane crash, Dallaire sent a 
message to New York saying, ‘Give me the means and I can do more.’ DPKO’s 
immediate reply was that ‘nobody is interested in that.’”103 Dallaire’s attempt to save the 
Rwandan prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana failed when the ten Belgian soldiers 
that he dispatched to protect her, laid down their weapons in compliance with the demand 
of the government soldiers, “in order to keep up with their mandate.” The prime minister 
was killed and the Belgians were taken to Camp Kigali where they were tortured and 
mutilated.104 Attempts to protect other politicians also proved fruitless, since basically 
the UNAMIR personnel had to negotiate with the killers in order to perform their duties. 
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On April 8, RPF renewed the war especially to rescue their 600 men who were trapped in 
Kigali.105  
During the first week of the genocide, the Security Council attention’s focused on 
the task of evacuating foreign nationals from Rwanda.106 No serious attempt was made to 
ensure the safety of the Rwandan civilians. Belgium withdrew its battalion on April 19 as 
had been predicted by the genocide planners. Consequently Dallaire had to redeploy the 
Ghanaian battalion from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to Kigali in order to protect his 
own force and small number of civilians.     
As the genocide raging throughout Rwanda, the Security Council was debating 
whether to withdraw UNAMIR or to change its mandate for intervention. 107 The camp, 
which insisted on withdrawal, argued that Rwanda was not a genuine threat to 
international peace and security and the future of UN peacekeeping should be considered 
since it depended on the willingness of member states to provide troops. The failure of 
the Security Council to take the necessary measures to protect their soldiers would cause 
them to refuse sending troops in the future. 
The camp that insisted on intervention did not have a strong case to influence the 
resolution. Not a single UNAMIR soldier represented their country. 108 An absence of a 
viable peace process and ceasefire, which are the preconditions for UN peacekeepers’ 
presence, blunted their arguments. They could only use moral arguments to stop the 
massacre—not a winnable argument in a realist world. On April 21, The Security Council 
voted to reduce UNAMIR strength to 270 personnel with an adjusted mandate, that is, to 
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negotiate a ceasefire, provide humanitarian relief operations, and monitor developments 
in Rwanda.109 
As reports of genocide reached the outside world, public outcry pressured the 
Security Council to revise the UNAMIR mandate. On May 17, almost six weeks after the 
genocide began, Resolution 918 was passed that increased UNAMIR strength to 5,500 
troops with the provision to provide safe passage for displaced peoples; assist and protect 
the relief efforts of humanitarian organizations; and provide protected sites for displaced 
peoples throughout Rwanda.110 The next usual problem was to solicit troops and 
equipment from member states. By the time full strength was achieved, the genocide 
subsided but not before nearly 850,000 killed were killed.111 
The UN did authorize France’s intention to conduct humanitarian intervention on 
June 22 for a duration of sixty days. Dubbed as “Operation Turquoise,” the 2,500 French 
soldiers quickly established a “humanitarian protected zone” in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-
Gikongoro triangle in southwestern Rwanda.112 Even though this operation provided 
sanctuary for around fifteen to twenty-five thousand Tutsis, it was criticized for providing 
a safe passage to the retreating genocidaires and Rwandan forces who fled the RPF 
advancement.113 
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By July 17, the RPF succeeded in defeating the Hutu regime forces and 
established a new government in Kigali.114 One of its leaders, Pasteur Bizimungu, a 
Hutu, was named as the President and Faustin Twagiramungu as the Prime Minister. The 
Chief of Staff of the RPF, Major General Kagame was named as the Vice-President. The 
RPF leadership announced that the new transitional government would serve for five 
years and adhere to the Arusha Peace Accord. By August 24, the RPF controlled most of 
Rwanda. The fallen regime leaders, coupled with their Interahamwe band, fled across the 
borders and encouraged and forced nearly two million of the population to flee with 
them.115 
The exodus into neighboring countries created a humanitarian disaster that 
captured international intention. With the new situation brewing, UNAMIR was tasked to 
ensure stability in the northwestern and southwestern regions of Rwanda; to stabilize and 
monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda in order to encourage the return of the 
displaced population; to provide security and support for humanitarian assistance 
operations inside Rwanda; and to promote, through mediation and good offices, national 
reconciliation in Rwanda.116 
Unfortunately, the strong presence of UNAMIR after the genocide drew severe 
criticism from the new government. The discomfort was easily understood. UNAMIR 
had failed to stop the genocide that happened in front of their eyes, and now they were 
providing humanitarian assistance for the fleeing genocidaires and halting the 
government’s effort to deal effectively with the cross-border insurgencies by 
Interahamwe and the former government forces. Finally when the UNAMIR mandate 
ended on March 8, 1996, it was not renewed and the withdrawal of the forces began on 
March 9 and was completed on April 19, 1996. 
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From 1997 to 1998, these former regime forces conducted guerilla activity 
particularly in the northwest area, bordering with democratic the Republic of Congo 
(DRC).  Schools, bars, buses and homes were attacked by Hutu rebels and resulted in the 
death of thousands of people.117 Apart from fighting guerillas, the Rwandan troops were 
charged to be the sponsor of rebel forces in the eastern part of DRC.118 On the other 
hand, Rwanda charged that the DRC was supporting and sheltering Rwandan rebels 
forces. In the meanwhile internal politics within Rwanda paved the way for Kagame to be 
at the forefront of the administration. On March 23, 2000, President Pasteur Bizimungu 
resigned from his office citing personal reasons and was replaced by Vice-President 
Kagame within twenty-four hours.119 Officially Kagame was sworn as Rwanda’s first 
Tutsi President on April 22, 2000. 
On July 22, 2002, Rwanda and DRC reached a peace agreement that might end 
the four years of conflict since the DRC agreed to destroy and to capture the Rwandan 
rebels sheltering in its eastern border. 
 
D. POST-CONFLICT PERIOD 
A nationwide referendum on a newly drafted constitution was he ld in July 2003. 
In the presidential election held on August 25, 2003, President Paul Kagame won 95.05 
percent of the total votes cast making him the first Rwandan President elected through a 
multi-party election. 120 
Rwanda has also embarked on a decentralization program in which local 
government officials, elected for five-year terms, are given the responsibility to provide 
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social services at the district levels. Presently, the major challenge for the government of 
Rwanda is to secure adequate funds and resources for local governments projects.121 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the genocide was established to try the 
planners of the genocide, but the trials are still continue at a slow pace and face many 
problems. On the other hand, the Gacaca traditional court system implemented within 
Rwanda to try the genocide perpetrators has achieved international publicity due to its 
effectiveness and is seen as a hope for dealing with the mass of suspects who were 
involved in the crime. 
Rwanda still faces severe development challenges. A USAID report noted that 
more than sixty percent of Rwandans were still living below the poverty line and more 
than ninety percent of the common farmers exist at the subsistence level. The average 
farm size decreased from 2.5 acres to 1.75 acres within a ten-year period (1991 to 2000). 
Poor farming practices led to severe erosion and declining soil fertility. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda resulted from the policies 
implemented by the colonizers. The rigorous transformation of Rwandan administrative 
structures coupled with inequalities in the opportunities for schooling and subsequently in 
the making of the elites bred resentment and hatred within the oppressed majority. 
Post-independence Rwanda saw a reversal of the treatment toward Tutsis. The 
Hutu government basically reused the colonizers’ policy to “punish” the Tutsis. 
Subsequent governments failed to address the issues adequately since the underlying 
issue was the scarcity of resources within Rwanda. When Hutu extremists were forced to 
share their power with others to realize a multiparty system in the early 1990s and 
coupled with a war with the RPF, the protracted conflict transformed into genocide, since 
the Hutu extremists feared losing ground to the Tutsis. The UN force that was present in 
Rwanda during the genocide period was unable to prevent its occurrence due to the 
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unwillingness of the international community to commit the necessary resources coupled 
with the lingering memory of the Somalia failure. 
In the post-conflict Rwanda, nothing much has changed that will alter the 
underlying causes of the conflict. Land pressure stands as the main issue, and positive 
accumulation of human capital is yet to be seen considering the large number of people 





















III. THE ROLE OF HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Investment in human capital accumulation is an important element in the 
reconstruction process of a post-conflict society since it can generate economic growth 
and individual advancement while combating unemployment, social exclusion and 
inequality. 122 Despite this fact, conventional international responses normally focus on 
emergency relief and economic reconstruction without paying much attention to the 
development of human capital. 123  
In a broad sense, human capital is defined as “the aggregation of the innate 
abilities and the knowledge and skills that individuals acquire and develop throughout 
their lifetime.”124 This definition is quite broad since it includes innate abilities that 
represent an individual’s inherent potential to acquire skills and knowledge either through 
inter-generational transfers, personal contacts, work experience, education or 
socialization. 125 For the purpose of this thesis, human capital is referred as the 
educational attainment of individuals developed through formal and informal educational 
processes influenced by the state.126 
Even though the effect of educational attainment is normally associated with 
increased social and economic well-being, a pattern where rebellions and conflicts are 
instigated and led by the “educated” also exists. The war in Southern Sudan between the 
Nuer and Dinka tribes that covering the period from 1991 to 1999 was widely acclaimed 
as “the war of the educated.”127 The educated leaders, Dr. Reik Machar and Dr. John 
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Garang, drove the Nuer and Dinka into war.128 From the perspective of the civilian 
populations, the war was imposed on them by their leaders. This was evident in the words 
of one of the tribal chief who stated: “The educated makes us fight.”129 In neighboring 
Ethiopia, the rebellion that toppled the feudal government was also driven and instigated 
by the intellectuals. Emperor Haile Selassie was toppled by the same educated class that 
he had nurtured in his attempt to modernize Ethiopia.130 In the case of Rwanda, the 
intellectuals’ role in the protracted conflict (propagating the ethnic hate agenda) and their 
subsequent participation in the genocide is quite evident.  
Those events bring into question whether being “educated” does not necessarily 
imply a moral obligation? 131 If the aim of education is to make people better, then the 
content of the education should be suited to the practical situation. 132 The curricula and 
syllabi used by schools and universities can influence whether graduates will foster 
development or promote subversion. 
For example, is it appropriate to incorporate a curriculum that promotes 
differences across ethnic groups? Is it more appropriate to design the education 
curriculum that promotes technical innovation and generates improved cultivation 
techniques, which, in turn, will increase agricultural output? Sadly, in the case of 
Rwanda, a country whose history revolved around ethnic discrimination in the pre-
genocide period, education had been used to distort information and encourage violence. 
Education, in Rwanda has not been used as a tool to foster development in a densely 
populated agrarian population. 
Another problematic issue affiliated with educational attainment is that 
improvements in human capital may provoke a latent conflict. Improvements in 
educational attainment normally increase political awareness. With the growth of literacy, 
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concurrent with widespread access to mass media, the perception of the people toward a 
certain issue can be shaped according to the agenda of the government. While education 
policy delivered through good governance may promote unity and beneficial political 
action, the reverse is true if education policy is in the hands of an authoritarian state.  
Lederach understands the relationship between education and conflict in that 
conflict is initially latent or hidden when people are devoid of the knowledge regarding 
the injustices that govern their life.133 People might know that inequality exists, but they 
accept it as the order of the day. Many traditional societies, including feudalistic and 
caste-oriented typify this type of existence. In order to resolve the latent conflict, 
Lederach suggests that the issue must be brought to the surface by erasing ignorance and 
raising awareness regarding the inequality and injustices. Only then can a mechanism be 
developed to solve or to address the issue. Obviously this strategy is very delicate and can 
be problematic.  If it is not approached diligently or tackled wisely, it can be the real 
spark that starts the fire of conflict.  
Ledarach’s strategy proved lethal in the long run for Rwanda since the latent 
conflict that was brought to the surface was deliberately manipulated by the educators to 
suit their agenda.  Chapter II established that there was no trace of organized violence 
between the Tutsi and the Hutu during their long period of coexistence in the pre-colonial 
history. Therefore there is a need to reexamine the educational system in Rwanda to 
include the educational environment and the actors and their visions. This chapter traced 
education policy and attainment from the pre- independence period until the post-
genocide situation, specifically focusing on how the generation of human capital shaped 
the pattern of the conflict. Hopefully, a clearer understanding can be obtained and applied 
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B. PRE-INDEPENDENCE SITUATION 
Pre-colonial education in Rwanda was large ly informal. Children were educated 
by their parents and relatives regarding Rwandan cultures and values throughout their 
childhood and also through a community-based education system (itorero).134 
This method emphasized practical work skills apart from the usual storytelling 
and dancing. Boys and girls were trained separately according to their future 
responsibilities. Boys were expected to follow their father’s footsteps and become the 
head of the household, whereas girls were trained in the duties of housekeeping and child 
rearing.135 
Roman Catholic Church missionaries introduced the modern Rwandan school in 
1908 with the blessing of the colonial administration. 136 The colonial administration had 
to rely on the churches to provide several public services such as education and health 
care, as they were expensive.137 This policy continued throughout the colonial period and 
characterized the education service in the post independence period. The extent of the 
missionaries’ involvement in this sector is illustrated by the official statistics for the 
period of 1956-1957 as in Table 1.  
In return for the missionaries contribution in providing the educational services, 
the Belgians cooperated with the missionaries’ evangelistic efforts.138 Invariably the 
main objectives of the missionaries were to evangelize the population and to train the 
administrators who would be the future elite of the country. 139 Unfortunately there 
existed a selective aspect that marked the concept of the education system ran by the 
missionaries.  There was a clear distinction made between educating a “Rwandan elite” in 
preparation for the administrative jobs, on one hand, and the training of the majority of 
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the people to play their role in a traditional setting. 140 In another word, education 































17 2,686 99.3 2,12 234,010 97.6 
Secondary 
 
2 2 50.0 365 219 37.5 
Schools for 
Teachers 
1 15 93.7 61 1,515 96.1 
Teacher 
Training 
1 8 88.9 36 391 91.6 
Special 
Schools 
4 29 87.9 401 1,469 78.6 
 
Table 1: The School System of Rwanda-Burundi, 1956 to1957 from141 
 
 
Within the school environment, students were separated in an apartheid style.142 
Being earmarked for the training as future elite, Tutsi students were given meat-based 
meals and milk while the Hutus, who were to play the traditional role, were only given 
maize porridge and beans.143 A literature that conveyed the division between the Tutsi 
and the Hutu was extensively distributed144 since the missionaries firmly believed that 
the Tutsi were born chiefs and the Hutus were simply incapable of becoming 
administrators. Leon Classe, Vicar Apostolic since 1913, set the vision to capitalize the 
missionary schools as a way to create an ethnically defined Christian aristocracy 
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composed of Tutsi.145 Moreover since the attendance at the school was paid for, it 
compounded the advantages for the wealthy Tutsis who were more capable to finance 
their children for the schooling.146 Table 2 below shows a sample taken of the college 
enrollment of students in the province of Butare147 (previously Astrida). From this figure 
it is evident that there existed a disproportionate imbalance between the enrollments of 
Tutsi and Hutu that resulted from the agenda that was carried out by the Catholic Church 
and the Belgian colonial government. 
     Year Tutsi pupils Hutu pupils Hutus As Percent of Total 
     1932 45    9           16.6 
     1945 46                3             6.1 
 
Table 2: Proportion between Tutsi and Hutu Students in the Province of Butare after148 
 
 
 Upon the completion of secondary education, the Hutus did not have many 
choices, except to become either theology students at the seminaries or blue-collar 
workers in the mines or industry. 149 These few Hutus who were lucky enough to obtain a 
post-secondary education viewed the world outside seminaries as a Tutsi-dominated 
enterprise. They were excluded from most avenues of social and economic advancement 
and unable to rise beyond the lowliest ranks of the civil service simply because of their 
“Hutuness.”150 Being systematically denied opportunities to which they felt entitled, bred 
a growing frustration and embitterment that was to play an important role in the 1959 
Hutu revolution. 151  
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However the initial attempts by these small educated Hutu to influence and to win 
the support of the Hutu masses in the first two provincial and state councils elections that 
were introduced by the Belgians failed, since the masses were still attached to the values 
and norms based on deference toward the ruling class.152 For the rural Hutu, inequalities 
between the masses and the elite class were an acceptable fact and norms of the day. The 
awakening of the Hutu masses about class-consciousness only materialized slowly with 
the changing of the missionaries’ sympathies toward the struggle undertaken by the small 
educated Hutus.  
The shift in the missionaries’ treatment of the Hutu in contrary to Classe’s vision 
was mainly due to three factors. First, by 1951, within the Rwandese church organization, 
the number of black Rwandese priests had grown in number and was threatening to 
overtake the power of the whites.153 These black priests were almost exclusively Tutsi, 
coinciding with the period when the educated Tutsis started to pick up the ideas of 
colonial political devolution and possible self-government.154 Obviously the Belgians 
were uncomfortable with these developments. Second, working closely with the Belgian 
administration that had shifted their policy to favor the Hutus in retribution for Tutsis 
demand for independence, the Catholic church switched their attitudes from supporting 
the Tutsi elite to educating, aiding and encouraging the Hutu to rise from their 
subservient position and assume the position of power after independence.155 Third, that 
period was also marked with the change of leadership within the Church hierarchy. The 
conservative clerics who originated from southern and southeastern Belgium were 
increasingly being replaced by Flemish clerics from humbler origins who knew first hand 
the experience of being treated as second-class citizens in their own country.156 
The Catholic church, which always had the vision to have an influence within the 
Rwandan government, started to sponsor the education of many of the Hutu and helped 
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them gain access to higher education. The abrupt change in the missionaries’ attitude 
however, did not suffice to rectify the inequalities that had developed over the previous 
three decades. Again, a sample on the college enrollment of students in the province of 
Butare taken for that period showed only a minimal increase in Hutus’ enrollment even 
though when compared to earlier periods, the increment was quite substantial: 
     Year Tutsi pupils         Hutu pupils Hutu As Percent  of Total 
     1954 63 19  (13 from Burundi)     23.2 
     1959 279  143     33.8 
 
Table 3: Proportion between Tutsi and Hutu Students in the Province of Butare in 1954 to 
1959 after157 
 
The extent of the church’s commitment to this issue went beyond Rwanda. Some 
of the Hutus, such as Gregoire Kayibanda, were sponsored by the church to stay in 
Europe where they could gain political experience in Christian Democratic trade 
unions.158 Apart from morally supporting the Hutu’s cause for social justice, the church 
also supplemented its logistical needs. The Hutus were allowed to used the church’s 
weekly publication, Kinyamateka, to disseminates their views and to debate the 
prominent issues of the day. 159 Even though the level of literacy in the countryside was 
very low, Kinyamateka was the main source of information for rural people. Those who 
could read would read the contents aloud which enabled illiterate Hutus to follow the 
political battles that were taking place in their name.160 Kinyamateka  proved to be an 
effective organ for the educated Hutu to openly confront the Mwami and his court and 
eroded the sense of legitimacy of the Mwami.161  
Over time, the pre-independence education system in Rwanda was characterized 
by the shifting of the attitude of the educator from favoring one group of the population 
                                                 
 157 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995) 33, with original source from Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praeger 
Publishing, 1970). 
 158 Christopher C. Taylor, Sacrifice As Terror:  The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 (New York:  Berg, 
1999) 43. 
 159 In fact Kayibanda was made the chief editor of Kinyamateka. 
 160 Lee Ann Fujii, “Origin of Power and Identity in Rwanda,” paper presented at the Annual 
Conference of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, 20 February 2001. 
 161 Ibid. 
39 
to another. The latent conflict was radicalized through the use of the mass media, which 
effectively penetrated every household in the villages. The mass media successfully 
raised the awareness among the Hutus that the Tutsi-ran state relegated the Hutu to 
second-class citizenship.162 With the backing of the colonial power, the effort undertaken 
by the small group of educated Hutu eventually succeeded when the last Mwami was 
overthrown and the Hutu political party won the election that led to the independence of 
Rwanda in 1962.163 
Compounding the problem of inequalities, the Belgian colonizer performed badly 
in building the human capital of Rwanda. There was only one Rwandan-Burundian 
studying at the University in Antwerp in 1951.164 There was none in other universities 
until 1955, and in 1956 there were only twelve students in the University at Elizabethville 
and twenty in the Lovanium University in Leopoldville.165 The number Rwandan-
Burundian students in the Lovanium University rose to forty-one in 1958-59 when 37 of 
them were Tutsis.166 In 1960 there was only one University in Rwanda with only thirty 
students.167 Such a low level of human capital accumulation did not prepare Rwandan 
adequately for the independence. On the other hand, when the majority of the highly 
educated were Tutsis, the situation was worse when post-independent Rwanda was to be 
led by the Hutu elite who was a staunch enemy of the Tutsis. 
 
C. POST-INDEPENDENCE TO GENOCIDE PERIOD 
Gregoire Kayibanda, who had lived through the inequalities in his early schools 
years, was to lead Rwanda after independence.168 Unfortunately at independence the 
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number of Hutu who had successfully completed higher education was very small. 
Within that small number of Hutu elites, there were even less who had an idea on how to 
democratize the education service. In fact, ethnic discourse had always been used as a 
means to divert attention away from inner contradictions within Hutu elites.169 
Consequently, these elites were more interested in fostering a policy of segregation in 
order to maintain their power base and extend their dominance into every state institution 
and economic sphere.170  
In the area of education service, the church continued to play a major role in 
educating Rwandans. Church involvement in education and other social programs 
conserved state funds and hence maximized their revenues.171 Of course the Church also  
viewed its involvement in these programs as an effective way to attract new members.172  
This working relationship between the church and the state was beneficial to both 
sides. Apart from the advantage in the form of economic savings, the church helped to 
increase the legitimacy of the state, while the state provided freedom for the church to 
implement its activities.173 The Kayibanda government designed a policy (including the 
education policy) to minimize the Tutsis involvement in state building. Post-
independence Rwanda saw the legacy of the colonial period applied in reverse. Using a 
quota system, the Tutsi were systematically discriminated against and repressed, 
especially in arenas that allowed for upward mobility, namely modern education, state 
jobs, and politics.174 Within the school environment, the discrimination occurred in 
various ways. Students were assigned with identification files that required them to 
internalize their ethnicity as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.175  The teaching of Rwandan history and 
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civics emphasized ethnicity that reinforced social division. 176 These practices led to 
conflict in and out of the classrooms and deteriorated relations between students, teachers 
and the community. 177 This discriminatory policy and the deliberate inclusion of the 
Tutsi myth178 inside the syllabus had an insidious effect on the organizational structure of 
educational institutions, the training of the teachers, and the content of textbooks.  Human 
capital that was generated through the education process was at the same time 
indoctrinated with the ideology that strengthened the ruling power and victimized the 
minority. Within an authoritarian system, even moderate college students who realized 
the issue would not be able to speak up against the injustices and insidious propaganda. 
Utterwulghe finds that the Hutu elites were successful in their propaganda policy 
since the reality validated the history they were trying to convey. 179 Within Rwanda, and 
despite the discrimination, the Tutsi lived fairly well socially and economically.180 
Proportionally, they still retained a larger portion of the economic and governmental 
resources with respect to their demographic share.181 Years of colonial rule that favored 
the Tutsi minority had produced hundreds of thousands of Tutsi who were wealthy and 
well educated when Rwanda achieved its independence. As described in the previous 
section, even though the Belgian reversed the education policy in the late 1950s the 
disparity between educated Tutsi and Hutu remained starkly evident.  
Juvenal Habyarimana, who took over the presidency from Kayibanda during a 
coup in 1973, continued with his predecessor’s strategy in persecuting the Tutsi and 
building his power base. In 1975 a system that was based on a quota of ethnicity and 
region was introduced as the criterion for admission to secondary education. 182 Access to 
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secondary education became very competitive due to the limited number of places in 
public secondary schools. In response to both constraints, parents set up private 
secondary schools.183 Unfortunately, many of these schools had poor teaching, were not 
approved by the government, and their graduates could not continue their studies into 
higher education. 184 These private schools mainly developed in rural areas and were 
often considered as “education for the poor.”185 Ironically since these schools had no 
access to government subsidies or assistance from donors, the rural poor bore the 
contributions and fees to support their children’s schooling. 186  
A survey on the level of education within the active population in 1992 displayed 
the acuteness of the problem: 
















Source: Survey on Employment, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
1992. 
 
Table 4: Level of Education of the Active Population in 1992 (percentage) from187 
 
Analyzing the data above, I conclude that Rwanda in the pre-genocide period was 
not a diversified economy. The education system and policy in Rwanda failed to assist 
the country in facing the economic crisis. In one extreme, the narrow portion of the 
population who had the privilege to complete a formal education were more prepared to 
compete for governmental jobs, which were scarce, and on the other side there was a 
much larger segment of the population that received a very minimal education. 188 Table 5 
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provides a more detailed indicator of the attainment of education level within the 
population and the means of employment before 1994: 
Educational Data: 
Literacy (%) 52.1% 
Average education (at age of more than 25 years) 1.1 year 
School enrollment in 1990 (between 6 to 25 years) 39% 




Population below the poverty line 85% 
 
      Table 5: Some Educational and Employment Indicators before 1994 after189 
 
Since not many Rwandans completed an education beyond primary school, they 
were more easily manipulated to serve the interest of the elites. Certainly the elites came 
from the slice of educated Rwandans. A consultant to a curriculum project in 
mathematics and statistics, Robert C. Johnson, who spent a month in Rwanda working 
with high school and university mathematics teachers, noticed that some people in the 
group were using the expression “C’est un paysan” (he’s a peasant) to criticize others.190 
This attitude of looking down on rural people and their life brings to our thinking that the 
education failed to delivers the “goodness” to Rwandan society. Johnson comments on 
the incidents sharply in his paper,  
[T]he educators were among the most conscientious and qualified group of 
people with whom the writer has had the opportunity to work, and all were 
serious about the task at hand and concerned about their students. Yet, with the 
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expression of such attitudes one must wonder what values are being transmitted 
and perpetuated.191  
 
The failure of the education system in Rwanda to instill morality and openness in 
the intellectual thinking manifested in the events that led to the genocide. Even though 
many of the educated Hutu had gone overseas pursuing higher degrees, how the state had 
molded their thinking remained and continued to shaped their behavior and perception. 
Going through the events, it was found that the educated were the planners and 
instigators of the genocide.  For example, the founder of the Hutu extremist party, 
Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR), Jean Shyirambere Barahinyura was 
“a well-educated man who had studied first in the Soviet Union and then in West 
Germany.”192 The CDR was instrumental in planning and organizing the genocide and 
notoriously associated with the extremism against Tutsi. Prunier observes,  
In the hysteria of Rwanda in April 1994, almost anybody might turn into a killer. 
But the responsibility lies with the educated people—with those in positions of 
authority, however small, who did not have the strength (or maybe even the 
wish) to question the poisonous effluents carried by their cultural stream.193 
 
D. GENOCIDE PERIOD 
Within the totalitarian government of Habyarimana, the people who profited more 
from his rule were understandably his cronies and supporters. Since the criteria for 
admission to higher education was dependent on a quota based on ethnicity and region, a 
large numbers of faculty members at the national university were from Habyarimana’s 
home region as they had received the privilege of pursuing a university education either 
locally or overseas.194 Others who taught at the university or at the government-
sponsored schools as well as the staff of research institutes, understood firmly that 
advancement in their career and perhaps continued employment depend largely on their 
“reports” on backing the government positions.195 Des Forges notes this succinctly in her 
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report, “Both those within Rwanda and those studying abroad wrote letters and made 
public statements that reported facts wrongly or misinterpreted data to support the official 
line.”196 
There were two prominent Rwandan academicians who were actively and 
notoriously involved in administering and enforcing the hate propaganda against the 
Tutsi and the calls for their extermination.  Dr. Ferdinand Nahimana, one of Rwanda’s 
most distinguished historians who had done his university study in Paris administered the 
radio station that broadcast the hate propaganda through his capacity as the director of the 
Rwandese Information Office (ORINFOR).197 He was appointed to the post after he left 
his teaching position. The first incidence that marked his notoriety was when Radio 
Rwanda broadcast all day long false news report that charged Tutsi-based Liberal Party 
of “advocating the terrorist killing of twenty-two leading Hutu, politicians, army officers, 
civil servants, priests, businessmen, and lawyers,” on March 3, 1992.198 The repercussion 
for this news was brutal. The very next day, Interahamwe militia began to kill Tutsi and 
burnt their huts in the Southern region of Rwanda. Approximately 300 people were killed 
during the six-day massacre.199 
In response to this incidence, Western ambassador lodged a stiff protest with 
President Habyarimana, which led to Nahimana’s dismissal from the ORINFOR director 
post, but unfortunately he was made a counselor to Rwanda’s ambassador in Bonn. He 
was, however, rejected by the German government and returned to his university post.200 
In the university, he developed the theory that “Radio Rwanda had been 
infiltrated by agents of the Rwanda Patriotic Front, backed by evil foreign diplomats 
determined to undermine Hutu self-defense.”201 His theory was used as a basis to drop 
the charges against over 400 persons implicated in the massacres mentioned above.202 
Later on, Nahimana was appointed to direct the operation of Radio-Television Libre des 
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Mille Collines (RTLMC), which was the most effective propaganda medium in Rwanda 
and was notoriously used as an instrument of genocide.203 
Dr. Leon Mugesera was another example of an educated Rwandan who was 
involved with the propaganda mechanism. He did his advanced university studies in 
Canada. 204 After he left his teaching position at the National University of Rwanda, he 
took up a post with the Ministry of Information and became the vice-president of the 
Gisenyi MRND party. 205 Being a good orator, he used his skill to influence the Hutu 
masses to take up a hard and brutal stand toward the Tutsi. His “success” was manifested 
in the violence that occurred instantly throughout the areas that he had preached.206 One 
notable example of his speech addressed to militant members MRND party on November 
22, 1992 proved to be prophetic:207 
The opposition parties have plotted with the enemy to make Byumba 
prefecture fall to the Inyenzi.208…. They have plotted to undermine our armed 
forces. …. The law is quite clear on this point: ‘Any person who is guilty of acts 
aiming at sapping the morale of the armed forces will be condemned to death.’ 
What are we waiting for? … And what about those accomplices (ibyitso) here 
who are sending their children to the RPF? Why are we waiting to get rid of these 
families? … We have to take responsibility into our hands and wipe out these 
hoodlums. …. The fatal mistake we made in 1959 was to let them [the Tutsi] get 
out. …. They belong to Ethiopia and we are going to find them a short cut to get 
there by throwing them into the Nyabarongo River [which flows northward]. I 
must insist on this point. We have to act. Wipe them all out!209 
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During the genocide, around 40,000 bodies were thrown into the Nyabarongo 
River that ultimately flowed into Lake Victoria via the Akagera River.210 This seriously 
polluted Lake Victoria to the extent that the countries bordering the area had to declare a 
state of emergency. 211 Eventually, international aid was required to help with the removal 
and burial of the bodies.212 Ironically, Mugesera was only temporarily arrested in Canada 
where he was employed as a university professor after the genocide.213 
At the lower academic level, teachers also were involved in abetting the genocide. 
Prunier found that the “Hutu teachers commonly denounced their Tutsi pupils to the 
militia or even directly killed them themselves.”214 Scherrer states that many teachers 
actively took part in the genocide “as rabble-rousers and agitators.”215 For example 
thirty-two out of forty-nine ringleaders of the genocide in the community of Nyakizu 
were teachers.216 Schools’ compounds became places where terrified Tutsis who were 
seeking shelter were mercilessly massacred. 
The extensive involvement of academician in the genocide revealed that the 
education system failed the Rwandan nation in 1994, and even before that. Henceforth 
the accumulation of human capital in Rwanda did not achieve the normally desired 
outcome of propelling the country into prosperity. Instead it was used blatantly by the 
actors to further the cause of extremism with disastrous consequences. 
Education can also be transmitted to the society through informal means. In fact, 
within an agrarian community, this method is more effective in shaping the perception of 
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the people. Due to the difficult access to formal education, newspapers and radio were 
efficient tools to deliver the government’s propaganda.  
Des Forges reported that the newspaper Kangura began spewing hate against the 
Tutsi after the RPF attacks in 1990.217 Other newspapers and journals soon followed. 
Even though the paper was published and sold in the Kigali capital, she noted that the 
urban workers usually carried copies of the newspaper to the hills when they went home 
for the weekends.218 Since around 52 percent of Rwandans were literate, those who knew 
how to read, read the papers for others, which effectively disseminated the propaganda 
throughout the community.219 
In comparison to the newspaper, the radio was more effective in delivering the 
message of hate and shaping public perspectives. But due to poverty, only 29 percent of 
all households had a radio in 1991.220 This did not prohibit the Hutu hardliners from 
using the radio station to broadcast their agenda. The RTLMC was fast to gain popularity 
because its broadcasts, which combined music and informal conversation, were attractive 
to the audience. Peoples who had no radio listened to the broadcast at the local bar or 
obtained the information from their neighbors.221  
 
E. POST GENOCIDE PERIOD 
The post-genocide government inherited what was left over in terms of human 
capital and a ruined Rwanda. Many teachers and students were killed and many others 
fled to the borders as refugees. A total of around 1,000 university students perished at the 
three branches of the National University of Rwanda.222 Within the small minority of 
Tutsi students in the university, not many survived the genocide while most of the Hutu 
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students fled the country. 223 About fifty instructors and one hundred and fifty staff 
members were killed and dozens of professors became refugees.224 University and 
schools’ compounds were destroyed while laboratory equipment and books were 
looted.225 The University of Rwanda was closed for a year after the genocide, but 
managed to reopen at Butare in 1995.226 The deplorable situation of schools in rural areas 
prior to the genocide was only exacerbated by the events.  
Perhaps the gravest effect of the genocide was destroying the social trust that 
bonded the Rwandan community. During the genocide, teachers were killing students and 
friends were killing each other. In order to recons truct the society again, the Rwandan 
government, through the Ministry of secondary Education of Scientific Research and 
Culture embarked on a project called the “Program of Communication and Civic 
Education for Rehabilitation of Confidence and National Reconstruction.”227 Rwandan 
children face depression due to the loss of their parents, witnessing violence, feeling 
guilty for the death of others, desiring revenge, feeling incapable of becoming the heads 
of households (with the lost of parents) and feeling pessimistic about the future. 
Therefore the program was established with the hope that it could normalize the 
relationship among students, teachers and surviving parents and serve as agents for peace, 
unity and reconciliation within the communities.228 Today this program emphasizes the 
skills of cooperation and communication and also conflict resolution. It is also intended 
to bridge the social capital of the future educated Rwandans in rebuilding their torn 
country.   
Since education should be regarded as a channel through which national 
reconciliation, poverty reduction and economic development can be brought about, the 
curriculum which is the heart of an education system should be given great 
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consideration. 229 Within this area, since the end of the genocide unt il year 2002, although 
the government was aware of the negative messages contained in the textbooks, teaching 
and learning materials remain unchanged and continued to disseminate the past culture of 
ethnic stereotypes.230 
Finally, in September 2002, a new textbook policy was finalized and a three-year 
plan for the review and revision of the primary school curricula and textbooks was 
established.231 Even though the policy appears very promising, it is yet to be assessed 
how far the implementation will go beyond the paper since it implies substantial financial 
implications.232 In general, post-genocide educational reconstruction revolves around the 
implementation of a durable educational policy, quality and relevancy of education, 
accessibility and equality, eradication of illiteracy, and capacity building in science and 
technology. 233 These are included in the government primary objective in Vision 2020. 
Within that vision, the government set the target that in the next twenty years, Rwanda 
will be established as a regional service and information center in order to attract foreign 
investment. Consequently, an educated workforce is needed. This demands a heavy 
investment in human resource development and capacity building. 234 
The primary objective for education in Vision 2020 is “to provide Universal 
Primary Education (UPE) by 2010 and subsequently Basic Education for All (EFA) by 
2015.”235  In order to achieve this objective, the government needs to address the high 
dropout and repetition rates of the students with different underlying causes and 
constantly review school curricula and teaching methodologies so as to equip the people 
with the appropriate life skills.236 
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This remains a challenge to the government since Rwanda is among the poorest 
countries in the world, despite achieving remarkable economic growth since 1994.237 The 
growth rate stabilized at 5.5 percent in 2001 and currently the GDP per capita stands at 
$260.238 Sixty-five percent of the 8.1 million population lives below the poverty line and 
ninety-one percent of the active population works in the agricultural sector, and two-
percent in the industrial sector.239 Within the education sector, the primary net enrolment 
rate is quite high at seventy-four percent but nevertheless the types of school 
administrative systems remained unchanged. So were their inefficiencies.  Throughout 
Rwanda there are four types of schools as shown in Table 6. 
Within the public and private subsidized schools the fact that most of the teachers 
have not completed a secondary education themselves led to poor teaching standards 
compared to the private schools.240  After the genocide the proportion of qualified 
teachers fell from sixty percent to thirty-three percent and those teachers often have to 
teach between sixty to eighty students per class.241 The student intake capacity is still 
limited and unevenly distributed among districts.242 Schools work under extremely 
inadequate material conditions with teaching supplies mostly limited to blackboards since 
other equipment may either be missing, not functioning or non-existent.243 
In general, most schools lack resources and textbooks are in acute shortage, or are 
not yet published in Rwanda.244 In some instances laboratories that were donated by aid 
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organizations are often not used or used ineffectively. 245 In the case study carried out by 
Earnest and Treagust, Rwanda’s schools’ facilities are described as being in extremely  
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dismal shape.247 There is an “acute need for significant improvement in water and 
sanitation facilities in most schools. Many schools had no toilets or latrines within the 
school and many had latrines outdoors.”248 This structural damage caused teachers to 
teach in difficult circumstances and students in the rural schools facing difficulties in the 
learning process 
Within the higher level of education, nearly half of all students are registered in 
the Faculty of Economics, Social and Management Sciences (33.9 percent), the faculty of 
Law (16.9 percent) and the Faculty of Arts (10.1 percent). The other faculties, which are 
nevertheless relevant as part of the major driving force behind the national economy, had 
fewer students: the Faculty of Sciences (3.59 percent) and the Faculty of Agronomy (3.6 
percent), Faculty of Educational Sciences (5.0 Percent) and the Faculty of Applied 
sciences (6.2 percent).249 According to the Ministry of Education, the pattern is not 
tailored to the country’ need and subsequently they are trying to create incentives to 
attract more students in disciplines deemed priorities for development.250 
Overall, the success and quality of the education system remain limited at all 
levels and in all sub-sectors and the internal and external efficiency of the system is 
weak.251 Obstacles that face the reconstruction include the number, qualifications and 
motivation of teachers, unevenly distributed intake capacity, low financial capacity, 
shortage of students in priority disciplines, wastage and poor adaptation and highly 
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F. SUMMARY 
Thus far I have presented extensively the extensive role of human capital 
formation in generating the conflict. Invariably I believe that the education system in 
Rwanda, which was inherited from the colonial period, actively perpetrated the insidious 
effect of segregation policy. With due respect to those who were not involved, I also 
believe that, there were significant contributions from the intellectual community who 
represented a small portion of the population in furthe ring the genocide agenda.  They 
consciously pursued this idea and used their intellectual capacity to influence the masses. 
Suffice it to say that the shape of the conflict was molded by the educated. The former 
Rwandan Minister for Higher Education and Scientific Research, Jean de dieu 
Kamuhanda, has been standing on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), facing nine counts of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide and directing 
public incitement to commit genocide.253 At the lower level, participation of the teachers 
in the genocide is more direct. 
On another note, informal education in the form of mass media also influenced 
the cause of genocide. The newspapers and the radio broadcasts were used effectively by 
the genocide planners to deliver their message and to influence the Hutu masses to 
participate in their agenda. 
In order to rebuild the education system, the stakeholders must instill into all 
Rwandans the positive values of society, a sense of security, unity and reconciliation and 
give Rwandans the essential skills to reduce their poverty. Central to the issue, the former 
curriculum should be reviewed in order to correct the shame and violence of the past. 
Textbooks must be cleared of historical and social prejudices, negative images and 
stereotypes of any groups in Rwanda. In term of the civic values, the curriculum should 
be changed to include values that could allow Rwandans to live peacefully, sharing a 
common identity without undermining their individual and group identit ies. It is 
imperative that the quality, content and orientation of education receive serious attention. 
Furthermore, there is also a pressing need to address the issue of accessibilities, 
equal opportunities, quality of teachers and teaching materials, greater student enrolment 
in disciplines deemed to be priorities for development, a more decentralized system of 
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management, a more liberal mass media and the participation of parents, government, the 
private and voluntary sectors as stakeholders in the reconstruction process. 
The ways and means to finance education must be found through a mix of public 
financing, investment from private sectors, and also direct contributions from firms, 
associations and individuals. By collaboratively building the human capital, it is hoped 
that the educated Rwandan graduated from the institutions will be the catalyst to foster 










































IV.  THE EFFECT OF RESOURCE SCARCITY 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Rwanda is among the smallest countries (26,388 km2) within sub-Saharan Africa. 
The country is landlocked and is nearly 700 miles from the Indian Ocean. Its neighbors 
are Uganda to the north, Congo to the west, Burundi on the south and Tanzania to the 
east. Except for the western and eastern border areas, most of the land is at least 3,000 
feet above sea level.  
Even though about 90% of the population depends on agriculture for their 
livelihood, only 32% of the land is arable and 10% holds permanent cropland.254 
Forested areas cover 12% of the land and other uses constitute about 45%.255 With such a 
huge proportion of the population dependent on a small portion of land area for 
cultivation, land is definitely a scarce resource. 
In fact the scarcity of arable land and also employment opportunity had plagued 
Rwanda prior to independence.  The Belgian colonial authorities regarded the country as 
over populated. The World Bank classed Rwanda as one of the poorest countries in the 
world and noted that Rwanda played only a subordinate role in the world economy. Its 
main manufactured products are sugar, lemonade, beer, cigarettes, blankets, plastic shoes, 
matches and soap. Ninety-nine percent of its exports are of primary commodities, which 
are coffee, tea and tin cassaterite, wolfframite, and pyrethrum, with coffee comprising 
around 50 percent to 80 percent of the total export.256 
 Van Hoyweghen observes that the Rwandan agricultural production system was 
“consumption-driven.”257 This implies that the farmers grew a mixture of seeds to satisfy 
the requirement of their particular environment. The capacity to have sufficient food at 
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the household level was a symbol of pride; consequently if forced to buy food due to 
insufficient home production, a farmer would lose dignity, as such a situation is 
considered as a sign of poverty. 258  This agrarian system in Rwanda has slowly become 
endangered. A high population growth rate of 3.2 percent a year, coupled with the 
majority of local people dependent on agricultural as a main source of income, places a 
high demand on land resources.  
On most farms, soil exhaustion greatly limits productivity. 259 Since family plots 
are fragmented and decreasing in size due to generational transfer, farmers had to 
cultivate their land to its limits in order to harvest the same amount of crops.260 With 
more farmers working smaller plots of land, productivity increases at the expense of soil 
degradation and erosion. 261 When this happened, farmers were unable to produce 
sufficient crops at a househo ld level and are forced to purchase food, which was 
considered shameful.262 In this context of scarcity, the resulting competition for land 
significantly fueled the conflict. 
In order to arrive at this conclusion, I examine the usage of land and ownership in 
Rwanda. Since the Rwandan land-tenure system is complex, detailed and historical, I 
divide the analysis into sections ranging from pre- independence until the post-genocide 
period. I discuss the Malthusian debate that surrounds population growth and the 
available land, which provides a more appropriate causal explanation. 
 
B. PRE-INDEPENDENCE SITUATION 
Land was always regarded as the most important asset for the Rwandan peasants 
and they favored living surrounded by their land.263 During the pre-colonial period, the 
Mwami delegated the management of land resources and the administration of the district 
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through his appointed chiefs called “umutware w’ubutaka” (chief of landholding), 
“umutware w’umukenke” (chief of pastures) and “umutware w’ingabo” (the chief of 
men).264 In every district these three chiefs worked independently of one another 
according to their line of jurisdiction and also engaged in a continuous reciprocal 
surveillance for the benefits of the inhabitants.265 This mechanism served the purpose for 
check and balance within the administration at the district level. 
Since land was used either for cultivation or as pastures, there were four main 
aspects of the land-tenure system. 266 First, the “Ubukonde,” or clan law, which was 
enacted by the head of the clan who was the first to clear the forest.267 The head of the 
clan was usually the chief who owned vast tracts of land on which he would settle several 
families called “abagererwa” and in turn benefited from a land tax in accordance with 
customary conditions.268 Second, the “igikingi,” or the right to establish a land domain 
accorded by the Mwami to the chief of pastures.269 He in turn distributed the available 
land to the pastoral families.270 Initially the tenants on igikingi were not constrained to 
provide food or services for the chief. 271 This was changed during the reign of Mwami 
Rwabugiri (1860 to 1895) since he increased the extractive capacities of the state.272 As 
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such, the tenants on igikingi paid their dues to the chiefs. Igikingi was one of the most 
common land tenure systems in Rwanda until the beginning of colonialism. 273  
Within this community a mechanism of acquiring cattle existed. The mechanism 
was known as “ubuhake” or cattle contract or clientship. A person who had a lot of cattle 
allocated a number of cattle to an employee in exchange for his service.274 At the end of 
the contract, the employee would receive a number of cattle as a barter trade for the 
services that he had fulfilled.275 Even though the working condition was very harsh, it 
provided an avenue  for a poor person to accumulate wealth and status by owning 
cattle.276 
The third aspect of the land-tenure system was the “inkungu.” Inkungu was a 
customary law that authorized the local political authority to dispose the escheated or 
abandoned land.277 These lands were normally grouped as land reserve from which the 
authority of the time accorded plots to any who required one.278 Fourth, the “gukeba” 
(also known as kugaba), which was the process of settling families into grazing land or 
on fallow land.279 Within these communities with agriculturalist and pastoralist living 
together, land rights were respected and transmitted from generation to generation, 
according to Rwandan tradition and custom.280 In summary, this customary law 
recognized land rights obtained in one of three ways: by inheritance (through the male 
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line), allotted by one of the chiefs, or by clearing new land to which no chief had laid 
claim.281 
When Rwanda fell under German colonization, the land tenure system remained 
fairly unchanged. The Mwami’s authority over the land was recognized by the Germans 
and this held the system in place.282 The system was drastically changed by the Belgian 
colonizer who disliked the idea that three chiefs co-governed within the same political 
district.283 As a result, this traditional tripartite structure, a well balanced system, was 
completely dismantled and transformed into a centralized administration.284  
Regarding the land-tenure system, the Belgian administration introduced a written 
law in addition to the established customary law. Two main ideas that formed the back 
bone of the written law in 1885 were the indigenous Rwandan should not be dispossessed 
of their land, but in any event, the right to occupy land taken from an indigenous 
Rwandan could only be guaranteed by the Belgian administration. 285 Furthermore all 
vacant land was considered as state-owned land.286  
Clearly these provisions initiated a dual system of land administration. All 
occupied lands were still subjected to the customary law while the written law only 
benefited the colonialist and the missionaries (there was a provision that dealt with the 
free transfers and concessions to scientific and religious associations as well as 
parastatals).287 In 1954, when the Belgian started to shift their support for the Hutus, they 
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introduced a written law that abolished the cattle clientship, or ubuhake.288 The Belgians 
saw that ubuhake bound poor people (usually Hutus who did not have cattle or a plot of 
land to cultivate) to powerful protectors, who were usually cattle-rich Tutsi.289 Even 
though the Belgian “liberated” the poor Hutus and allocated the ownership of the cattle to 
those Hutus who looked after it, the Belgian failed to redistribute the pasture land.290 This 
led to a situation in which many Hutu had cattle but without a grazing area, and this 
precipitated a rapid decline of available land and worsened ethnic relations.291 
Compounded to this problem, the Belgian introduced a system called 
“paysannats” to solve migration due to the high population density and the need to 
explore new areas.292 Paysannats was quite similar to the system of gukeba.293 The only 
difference was that it was developed in regions with a lot of grazing land and land 
reserves and consisted of giving each family two hectares for cultivating crops such as 
cotton and coffee.294 Paysannats emerged after the suppression of the ubuhake and 
ibikingi and encouraged the peasants to grow cash crops.295 Clearly, the Belgian favored 
an economic development based on agriculture, to the detriment of cattle-raising and thus 
completely disrupted the balance that had always existed between the two .296 
In the 1959 Hutu revolution, the land and cattle that belonged to the thousands of 
Tutsis who were either killed or who fled to neighboring countries of Burundi, Zaire and 
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Uganda were quickly claimed by land-hungry, agriculturalist Hutus.297 Considering that 
by early 1962, there were around 120,000 refugees, one can estimate the size of the 
abandoned land left by them. 
 
C. POST-INDEPENDENCE TO GENOCIDE PERIOD 
The post-independence government implemented several policies in dealing with 
the scarcity of land and overpopulation.  Soon after independence, the government 
embarked on a resettlement project by moving a large number of peoples from the 
densely populated northeastern areas (Gikongoro, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Kibuye) to the 
western and southern part of the country. 298 This resettlement program displaced over 
80,000 farmers and their families into previously unsettled areas.299 During this period 
the government tried to organize the habitat in paysannats system for the rationalization 
of the land use and land occupation. 300 The paysannats policy that had been implemented 
by the Belgian administration before was revitalized to encourage the farmers to grow 
cash crops, especially coffee.301   
Another policy implemented by the government was to increase agricultural 
production to cope with rapid population pressure.302 Within this policy, the government 
sponsored the conversion of pastures into cultivated land, which reduced the production 
of manure, which in turn decreased the fertility of the soil. 303 On the other hand, 
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imported fertilizers were often too expensive for normal farmers.304 Apart from trying to 
improve insufficient food production, this policy had a clear implication: the Tutsis’ 
pastures or grazing lands were increasingly turned into Hutu farming lands.305   
 
 
Figure 2: Rwanda Perfectures 
Another consequence to this policy was that the soil protection offered by forest 
cover had decreased dramatically due to the loss of up to a quarter of the natural forests 
since 1960, which was used for subsistence agricultures and cash crops.306 However, the 
areas devoted to communal forests had increased since there was a strong need for timber 
and fuelwood.307 Table 7 shows the evolution of cultivated areas, pastures, fallow land 
and forest from 1970 to 1986: 
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Utilization 1970 1980 1986 Percentage of increase (+) 






















Total 1,242,700 1,243,660 1,248,360  
 
Table 7: Use of Pastures, Cultivated Areas, Fallow Land and Forest in Hectares after308 
 
In 1976, a law was passed to control tightly the purchase and sale of land. The 
activity had to have the permission of the minister in charge of lands, and it was an 
obligation that the seller had at least two hectares remaining, and that the buyer did not 
possess more than two hectares.309 Since then, the state only recognized the right of 
ownership based on land registration and other than that all lands belong to the state.310  
There were several features that colored the issue of land scarcity within this 
period. In the densely populated areas, such as Ruhengeri and Butare, the number of land 
transactions increased notably. 311 Many peasants also resorted to renting land for a 
number of years as a means of survival.312 Compounded to this problem was the 
fragmentation of family holdings through generational transfers. According to the 
inheritance law, the land would be subdivided among male heirs with every boy aged 18 
qualified for a part.313 When a subdivision became too small, either another plot had to 
be bought or the peasants had to go further afield to acquire new lands.314 Table 8 
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illustrates the intensity of the problem. By 1990, the density of persons per cultivable 
hectare had nearly tripled from the figures of 1960: 






















Note: Population numbers were taken on December 31. 
 
Table 8:  Number of Rwandan Population and Farmland Density for the Period from 
1960 to 1990 after315 
 
 It was noticeable that land scarcity caused a considerable internal and external 
migration during this period. People moved from the densely populated areas to areas 
previously underpopulated due to a lack of water, poor soil condition or tsetse 
infection. 316 There was also migration to urban areas particularly among the youth who 
were looking for jobs due to the shortage of land for farming,317 but this incidence was 
limited since the government held firmly to its economic ideology, which promoted the 
idea that the Hutu “holy way of life” was farming.318 Thus, people could not change 
residences without the government’s permission and the government itself did not make a 
significant attempt to diversify the economy as a solution to the pressing problem. 319 
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Lacking a viable solution, other peasants choose to migrate to Zaire, Uganda, and 
Tanzania seeking available land.320 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the “new” land within Rwanda no longer existed, 
and with population growth steadily increasing, serious problems began to emerge--
namely, soil degradation and available land for cultivation. 321 The peasants’ attempts to 
increase the output of the farm by triple-cropping their shrinking plot resulted in soil 
exhaustion.322 
 Adding insult to injury, in 1989 the price of coffee dropped by almost 50% on the 
commodity markets.323 Apart from directly affecting the income of hundreds of 
thousands of small-scale coffee farmers, this incident also affected every Rwandan. 
Partly as a result of this crash in commodity prices, the World Bank engineered a 
“Structural Adjustment Program” to salvage Rwanda’s economy.324 Devaluation on its 
currency immediately increased prices for virtually all Rwandans. Moreover, public 
services provided by the government were dramatically curtailed.325 The cost of water, 
health care and schooling increased, hurting the families who were already suffering from 
the reduced coffee price.326 Within an agrarian community, a shortage of land and a 
decrease in the price of the cash crop intensely challenged the Rwandans’ survival. 
By 1990s, regarding land, the country already faced a deadlock.327 Other 
problems included insufficient agricultural production, an ever increasing population 
exhausting natural resources, a growing number of landless peasants, and the pressure to 
accept the return of the refugees from Uganda. There were at least 700,000 refugees in 
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1990 and a huge percentage of them living in Uganda.328 When the Ugandan government 
established an ancestry requirement for Ugandan citizenship in 1990, the Tutsi refugees 
were forced to reestablish themselves in Rwanda.329 Understandably, Habyarimana had 
adamantly refused to allow Tutsi refugees back into the country, insisting that Rwanda 
was too small and too crowded to accommodate them. 330 The estimated population 
densities can be verified from Table 9.  






















































Table 9: Estimated Rwandan Population Density on January 1st, 1991 after331 
 
Pressured to leave Uganda due to the ancestry requirement, and unable to gain 
acceptance by the Habyarimana government, the RPF launched an attack from the North 
(with bases from Ugandan border) that caused a massive displacement of the northern 
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population to the south. During this period, Rwandans faced a very difficult situation. 
People displaced by the war were justified in hating the RPF, and so were the Tutsis.332 
Other Rwandans especially the youths, at this stage, found themselves looking at the 
prospect of no land, no schooling, no jobs, and no hope of a better future.333 Embittered 
and desperate, thousands of the youth were easily manipulated by the Habyarimana 
government to be mobilized, either in the armed forces to fight the war against the RPF 
or into the militias, which were to carry out the genocide.334  
 
D. GENOCIDE PERIOD 
Clearly, the growing poverty and land scarcity fueled the genocide and these 
factors also helped to explain the readiness with which the jobless and landless took to 
killing Tutsi when they were promised to be rewarded with land or property left by 
Tutsi.335 Des Forges notes strongly in her report that most of the genociders fought not 
over money but over land, crops or cattle.336 As a result, during the genocide, the 
extremist government directed the burgomasters337 to manage the disposition of Tutsi 
goods and land promptly to avoid clashes.338 In turn, the burgomasters ordered their 
subordinates to prepare inventories of the Tutsis’ property and a list of those killed.339 
This was used to identify which Tutsi household were completely eliminated, hence their 
                                                 
332 Since RPF was normally affiliated with Tutsis refugees. 
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property was available for distribution, or which households still had some survivors, 
meaning the land would only be available after further killings.340 
On the other hand, in their in-depth case study, Catherine Andre and Jean-
Philippe Platteau found that the genocide victims (either Tutsi, Twa or moderate Hutu) in 
the area that they studied could be categorized in three ways.341  
The first category consisted of the persons who owned much real estate. This 
included old persons who had accumulated much land; relatively young persons who 
were resented because they had access to off- farm income opportunities and hence were 
able to purchase land parcels but refused to redistribute their wealth to the poor villagers; 
the troublemakers who were notoriously affiliated with scuffles and conflicts (including 
land disputes); and the Tutsi landowner.342  
In the second category were the young people who engaged in the militias and in 
the third category were the poor people who had no land or “access to regular off- farm 
income opportunities.”343 Table 10 verifies Andre and Platteau’s finding in a locality that 
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Characteristics of Kanama’s inhabitants who 
were known to have died during the genocide. 
Ratio of dead people 




1.Persons who owned much land 
        a. The elderly* 
        b. Young people with economic success 
        c. Persons considered to be troublemakers 
        d. Tutsi 
 
2. Youth engaged in militias** 
 




























* People were considered to be old when they had children of age to marry and 
therefore tensions over land could arise between father and sons. 
** Since their activities were shrouded in mystery (they are organized as secret 
societies), information about the total number of Kanama’s inhabitants engaged as 
militias was impossible to obtain without serious risk to the investigator. 
*** Eight out of these eleven victims were children. 
 
Table 10: Category of the Genocide Victims and their Percentage with respect to the 
Total Number in the Same Category after344 
Obviously the proportions of the victims who owned much property (26.8%) were 
much higher than the overall ratio of the people killed with respect to the whole 
population of Kanama (5.4%). This suggests that the genocide provided an avenue for the 
villagers to reshuffle land properties or seek revenge even among the Hutus.345 
 
E. POST-GENOCIDE PERIOD 
Apart from decimating a large proportion of the Rwandan population, the 
genocide also resulted in millions of refugees and displaced persons.346 After the 
genocide, the government had to solve intense land related problems that stemmed from 
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several issues. First, around 800,000 “old caseload” refuges who left in the years 1959 to 
1973 returned in 1994 were devoid of any ownership of land.347 Second, there were one 
million internally displaced people during 1994.348 Third, in 1996 to 1997, 1.4 million 
refugees returned from Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire and in most cases huge groups 
returned in a matter of weeks.349 Fourth, the period of 1997 to 1998 saw an increase in 
insurgency activity that displaced 600,000 people form the prefectures of Gisenyi and 
Ruhengeri.350 Fifth, since more than 90% of the population was dependent on agriculture 
as their means of subsistence, badly degraded soil had a tremendous impact on their lives. 
Soil erosion had worsened due to the lack of reliable soil conservation methods, 
uncontrolled and almost continuous cultivation (hence a shortened fallow period) and 
exploitation of marginal land that was unsuitable for agriculture.351 Finally, there were 
many widows and orphans who had difficulties managing the land left by their deceased 
husbands or parents.352  
The government responded in several ways to solve these problems. Some of the 
1959 refugees were permitted to occupy the abandoned land temporarily. 353  Others were 
given state lands to enable them to produce. The state lands that were partitioned and 
distributed were the Mutara Game reserve, two-thirds of the Akagera National Park, the 
Gishwati Mountain Forest and the lands that belonged to certain state-owned projects.354 
In the province of Kibungo, Umutara, and Kigali Rural where people still possessed 
                                                 
347 Ministry For Lands, Human Resettlement & Environmental Protection, Brookings Initiative in 
Rwanda: Land and Human Settlement (2001) 61, during the Arusha accord both parties (the standing 
Rwandan government and RPF) had agreed that “with a view to promote social harmony and national 
reconciliation, refugees who fled the country over 10 years ago not claim their property if it has been 
occupied by other individuals. To compensate them, the government will put land at their disposal and will 




351 Eugene Rurangwa, “Land Policy and Land Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: Perspective of Land 






sizeable properties, many family plots were divided and shared between the owners and 
the old case refugees.355  
These actions were implemented through a policy called “imidugudu” or 
villagisation policy. This policy called for the construction of houses in settlement sites 
that effectively grouped all rural dwellers into villages as opposed to the traditional 
method of living.356 
There were several advantages that were auspiciously perceived by the 
government in implementing the policy. First, with the population living closely in the 
villages it was easier and more cost-effective for the government to provide basic 
services such as water and sanitation, health care and education. 357 Second, these villages 
were more easily connected with roads and communication networks that would support 
market access and off- farm income generating activities.358 By settling people in clusters, 
markets could be developed, “as well as agro- industries and off- farm incomes.”359 Third, 
the imidugudu concept could enhance security since by living close together it was easier 
for the security forces to protect the villagers from the insurgents, and they could 
simultaneously hinder360 the infiltrators from securing hideouts and covert support. 
Fourth, the government envisioned that by distancing the farmers from their land, the 
emotional attachment to the land as a part of a family heritage could be detached. 
Subsequently the government believed that this effect would make the farmers more 
likely to treat land as economic goods that could be valued only in terms of its productive 
capacity.361 
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Unfortunately, a practical implementation of the imidugudu policy in the midst of 
the urgency to meet the housing needs of a huge number of people within a short period 
of time created several problems. First, many of the projects were inadequately planned 
and the site selection was poorly chosen resulting in disastrous social, economic and 
environmental outcomes.362 The decision to locate the imidugudus that were far from the 
farmland caused a significant fall in food production in some areas.363 Understandably 
the site selection process was governed mostly by the availability of land since high 
population density and acute shortage of land remained as the greatest challenge for 
Rwanda.364 The shortage of public or state land forced the imidugudu to be installed on 
the lands of citizens.365 Since the government lacked sufficient resources to compensate 
the property owners whose land was taken for building imidugudu houses, the 
government decided that those who lived in the imidugudu should pay the 
compensation. 366 The mechanism to settle the issue was left for the villager to decide.367 
Unfortunately, rarely did the land owners receive the compensation since the new 
villagers either did not have anything to offer or refused to compensate due to some past 
enmity.368 Contrarily, the owners of the land faced many difficulties in resuming their 
lives. They were either deprived of compensation, or the remaining farmland that they 
had, or the new farmland that they received in exchange was too far from their 
residence.369 Second, a failure to secure local participation in the planning process 
resulting in a poor sense of ownership among the communities, to the extent that some 
people considered that the houses they were living in belonged to the organization that 
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constructed it.370 Third, a failure to take into account the community structures when 
populating the new villages resulting in some villages consisting mostly of either 
widows, one social group or a very vulnerable people.371 
The land issue remained an enormous challenge for the government since many 
families were still landless, and they had to sustain themselves by cultivating small 
borrowed or rented plots.372 Others worked on the land belonging to someone else for 
wages or in exchange for the right to cultivate a small piece of land for themselves. 373 
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs found that the imidugudu 
residents in the region of Bugesera depended on food aid for survival since they had less 
easy access to land.374 Naturally, those who lost their land in the process of creating the 
imidugudu suffered enormous hardship and burned with enmity.375 
According to the consultations on national unity and reconciliation, land disputes 
were the greatest factor that hindered sustainable peace.376 These disputes ranged from 
conflicts over distribution of village plots, land redistribution operation, land exchange, 
inheritence and property violations.377 Land also had been badly managed to the extent 
that soil erosion has worsened due to continuous and uncontrolled cultivation, 
exploitation of marginal land and the lack of reliable soil conservation methods.378 
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F. ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY 
The relationship between ecological resource scarcity and conflicts invokes 
Thomas Malthus’ argument in “The Principle of Population,” in which he asserts that 
there is a time when the population growth reaches the limit of subsistence, it will be held 
back by epidemics, infanticide, famine and war.379 Many authors either agree or disagree 
with Malthus’ theory. As a brief overview, the various positions in the debate can be 
camped into three proponents, that is, the anti-Malthusian, hard-Malthusian, and the soft-
Malthusian. 380  
The first school of thought completely rejected Malthusian argument and argues 
that there is no relationship between conflicts and ecological resource scarcity. They 
understand that population growth will stimulates progress and economic growth since 
with more people there will be an increase in knowledge and technological innovation, 
which will lead to better economic activity and organization. 381 Simon asserts that new 
inventions will actually spur population growth since with this invention, there will be a 
diffusion of new methods, which in turn will increase the output for a given amount of 
labor and land. This will make additional population growth possible.382 On the other 
hand, population growth will require better agricultural methods. This in turn will require 
more labor per worker.383 Hence both cases complement each other in dealing with the 
positive attributes of population growth and disproved the Malthusian theory. Boserup 
also discarded Malthusian theory in her work.  She asserts that population growth is an 
                                                 
379 Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1999) 28-46. 
380 Dixon simplified the debate by categorizing three main positions that is the neo-Malthusians, the 
Economic optimists, and the distributionist. Other author, for example, Frank Furedi, in his writing, 
[Population and Development: A Critical Introduction (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997)] categorizes 
eight proponents in the debate, that is, the developmentalist perspective, the redistributionist perspective, 
the limited resources perspective, the socio-biological perspective, the people-as-a-Source-of-Instability 
perspective, the women and human rights perspective, the people-as-problem-solver perspective and the 
religious pro-natalist perspective. Lief Ohlsson, in his dissertation, [“Environment, Scarcity, and Conflict: 
A Study of Malthusian Concerns,” University of Goteborg, 1999, 99-112] identified seven positions that 
were adapted by the social scientist when applying Malthusian theory in the Rwanda case studies. These 
positions can be seen as either avoidance, rejection on principled grounds, intuitive acceptance, 
determining the role of scarcities, determining the role of the developmental model, empirical corroboration 
and empirical refutation. 
381 Peter Uvin, Avoiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (Connecticut: Kumarian 
Press, 1998) 183. 
382 Julian L. Simon, Research in Population Economics (Connecticut: Jai Press, 1978) 165-186. 
383 Ibid. 
77 
independent variable, which will determine the agricultural developments, that is, with 
more people, the agricultural sector will be affected with better cultivation techniques, 
which will increase the output and improve the social structures of agrarian 
communities.384 
The problem with this camp is that it cannot explain the genocide in Rwanda. If 
this theory is to be applied to Rwanda in the pre-1994 genocide all the arguments will 
break down. Habyarimana had repeatedly refused to accept the return of refugees based 
on his reason that Rwanda had been overpopulated. The legitimacy of Habyarimana 
government was challenged when he failed to address the issue of the famine that 
ravaging the country in 1988. If the anti-Malthusian theory is correct, then supposedly 
more population in Rwanda means more output from arable land since population growth 
will push for the adoption of productive agricultural work. Unfortunately this did not 
happen because Habyarimana did not implement a policy that call for agricultural 
modernization. But this is the point that the anti-Malthusian will make. For them, if the 
Habyarimana government seriously pursued the use of technology for agricultural work 
or for diversifying the economy, and establishing more industry that can generate 
products for exports, then there will be no shortage of food. The output from the 
agricultural sector will multiply with the use of technology or the income from the  
exports will be adequate to buy more food. To the anti-Malthusian resource scarcity in 
Rwanda is only a social construct, that is, the outcome of government policy. However 
that explanation affirmed that the conflict was partly generated by the land scarcity 
pressure, which was a byproduct of government policy. 
The second school of thought, which is known as “hard” Malthusian sees a direct 
relationship between overpopulation and resource scarcity with famine and conflict since 
population increases exponentially when unconstrained while the subsistence or food 
increases linearly. 385 Arithmetically, eventually the population growth will exceed the 
level of subsistence available. When a country is overpopulated, with food production 
maximised, invariably people will be driven to find subsistence. Competition for the 
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scarce resources will generate a conflict or otherwise a ravaging famine will neutralize 
the effect.   
R. Ehrlich and H. Ehrlich contend that a “population explosion” has already 
resulted in environmental devastation, poverty, hunger and violent conflict.386 They see a 
direct connection between population growth and the reduction of subsistence. For them, 
in order to arrest the impending disaster, an action to end the “population explosion” 
should be made, that is, through birth control. They assume that if the human birthrate 
can be lowered slightly below the death rate, then population will gradually decline. 
Otherwise the growing population will rapidly debilitate nonrenewable resources or 
transform renewable resources into nonrenewable ones with the overall effect of reducing 
the capacity of the environment to support the growing population. 387  
Another proponent of the hard-Malthusian position is Garrett Hardin. She uses the 
metaphor of a lifeboat to illustrate the effect of overpopulation. For her, eventually the 
lifeboat can no longer accept extra passengers without sinking it. It is the same with the 
nation’s land. If the population continues growing, it will exceed the capacity of the 
land.388 Furthermore with the population growth rate in the poor countries doubling that 
of the rich countries while the world resources are decreasing, the gap between the rich 
and the poor is widening. As such, the pressure to compete for the limited land or 
resources will increase.  
Hardin stresses that an environment that is open to all is subjected to abuse if 
there is no proper control. It only takes one person to start abusing the environment, 
which can then create a chain of reactions. The users of a common environment or 
resource may eventually destroy the very resource upon which they depend. Hardin 
contends that continued population growth will pollute resources.389 
These hard-Malthusian views are flawed on two aspects. First, they must hold that 
other elements within the population remain constant in order to infer the causal 
relationship between population growth and subsistence (increases or decreases in 
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population growth causing the inverse effect on subsistence).  Second, the hard-
Malthusian argument works on the law of diminishing return. This means, with a fixed 
size of a farm, the production per labor will decline with the addition of each new laborer. 
However, in the real world, both of these assumptions do not hold since all the variables 
within the population equation keep changing and are not constant. For example, the 
expanding human mind and creativity will spur technological advancements that can 
increase agricultural production. 390 Changing in societal organization or government 
policies also will effectively avoid the situation in which the population growth is greater 
than the capacity to sustain them. Even the unpredictability of the nature itself or sheer 
luck will mitigate the relationship between population growth and subsistence.391 
The hard-Malthusian attempts to attribute the genocide in Rwanda directly to the 
issue of overpopulation and the scarcity of arable land is also not plausible. Many other 
countries, for example, Tanzania and Bangladesh that have a higher population density 
and are basically as poor as Rwanda did not experience a violent conflict.392 This led us 
to the third school of thought, whom I call the soft-Malthusian that stands between the 
two extremes, that is, the optimist anti-Malthusian and the pessimist hard-Malthusian. 
The proponents of the soft-Malthusian position argue that social conflict is not an 
unavoidable outcome of resource scarcity. There are intervening variables that may vary 
the effect. These intervening variables such as the accountability and legitimacy of the 
state, political processes, economic activities, patterns of innovation and social 
cooperation can modify the resultant outcome of resource scarcity whether it will or will 
not causes a conflict.   
Prunier states that the pressure generated by the effect of overpopulation in some 
way contributed to the genocide. The willingness of ordinary Hutu peasants to take part 
in the massacres when instructed by the politicians displayed the peasants’ line of 
thinking that with the elimination of the Tutsis, there will be a lot of space available for 
                                                 
390 This is an anti-Malthusian argument that was presented before. 
391 Ann F. Wolfgram and Maria Sophia Aguirre, “Population, Resources and Environment: A Survey 
of the Debate,” The Catholic University of America, assessed electronically on 04 June 2003, <http://arts-
sciences.cua.edu/econ/faculty/aguirre/resenv.htm> 
392 Peter Uvin, Avoiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (Connecticut:  Kumarian 
Press, 1998) 182-183. 
80 
them.393 In his argument Prunier illustrated that the overpopulation problem by itself did 
not cause the genocide. In fact, the genocide was orchestrated by the ruling elites in order 
to salvage their loosening power over the control of the rural population. Having 
accustomed to rule Rwanda in a totalitarian way, Habyarimana government was not 
happy when the Western aid donors forced the government to establish a multiparty 
system as a prerequisite for the economic aid. This is clearly described by Prunier in 
illustrating the intention of Habyarimana in signing the Arusha Peace accord. “President 
Habyarimana had consented to sign the Arusha Peace agreement not as a genuine gesture 
marking the turning over of a new political leaf and the beginning of democratization in 
Rwanda, but as a tactical move calculated to buy time, shore up the contradiction of the 
various segments of the opposition and look good in the eyes of the foreign donors.”394 
After the peace accord was signed, the political circles around Habyarimana 
organized a plan to exterminate the Tutsi as well as the Hutu dissidents in order to remain 
in power.395 The lust for power drove them to commit to this agenda. 
The fact that Rwanda had been densely populated largely favored their agenda 
since the population had been under enormous pressure to sustain agrarian life within the 
small space available. Coupled with other variable, such as the “issue of Tutsi threat” 
which had been deliberately brainwashed on the Hutu population by the state, resulted in 
the easiness of the ruling elites to mobilize the Hutu masses in executing the genocide.396 
I believe that this line of argument is more convincing since it takes into consideration 
the cumulating events that happened during the pre-genocide period to form up a causal 
explanation for the genocide. Invariably it was found that the issue of resource scarcity 
due to overpopulation contributed to the cause of genocide via political process. 
Another author who adapts a soft-Malthusian approach in explaining the genocide 
in Rwanda is Peter Uvin. Uvin uses an analogy of transmission belt in explaining the 
linkage between the genocide and resource scarcity. Uvin points out that in real lives, 
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people are dealing with a “web of interactions.” Thus, any issue cannot be seen in 
isolation. 397 For him, in order to arrive at the explanation of genocide with respect to the 
resource scarcity, there were three important factors that transmitted the pressure of 
resource scarcity into the execution of the genocide. The first factor was the legacy of the 
conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi that traces back to the social revolution in 
1959.398 The conflict that ended in 1963 displaced thousands of Tutsi as refugees. 
Subsequently, their abandoned land was occup ied by the Hutu farmers. The successive 
attempt by the RPF to invade Rwanda in late 1980s and early 1990s raised the fears of 
the Hutu, that the land they were cultivating would be reclaimed by the returning Tutsi 
refugees if the RPF won the war. The Hutu extremists also deliberately fueled this fear in 
order to achieve their agenda. The government’s persistence to block the return of the 
refugees on the basis that Rwanda had already been overpopulated also alarmed the 
Hutu’s mind. 
The second causative factor was the economic crisis faced by Rwandan for a 
decade beginning in 1984. A decreased food production coupled with the crash of the 
prices for coffee and a reduction in jobs caused severe hardships for many families. Since 
the crisis spanned for a long time, a lot of young people who were unemployed saw no 
hope in improving their lives. This sense of hopelessness drove them to participate in the 
ensuing genocide orchestrated by the government since they saw a lot to gain from it. 
The third contributing factor was is the attempted invasion by RPF in the early 
1990s. This war displaced around one million Rwandan from the northern region to the 
refugee camps around Kigali. Consequently, the capital’s population rose dramatically 
and were littered with thousands of young people who were unemployed and dissatisfied. 
This situation presented perfect breeding grounds for extremism and radicalism against 
the minority Tutsi. Apart form that, an increase in military expenditures to fight the war 
resulted in a reduce budget for social and development programs, which in turn had 
increased the hardships faced by the common people. 
Hence I believe that even though resource scarcity in Rwanda, the issue of land 
ownership, did not automatically generate a lethal conflict, it stood as the biggest causal 
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factor based on several aspects. First, the peasants were pressured to maintain their 
livelihood on a shrinking plot of land. Second, there was a constant fear that they would 
lose the land to the Tutsi if the RPF took over the country. Third, the youths who were 
not prepared to seek a livelihood other than being farmers were disillusioned with the 
“situation” that caused unemployed and left them without a plot of land to farm. This 
“situation” was generated due to a government policy that failed to address the issue of 
resource scarcity and rapid population growth.  
James Gasana who was the Rwandan ex-Minister of Agriculture published his 
analysis on the effect of natural resource scarcity toward violence in Rwanda in a 2001 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) book on 
environment and conflict.399 Gasana identified three factors that turned the social effect 
of natural resource scarcity into violence.400 First, a large population who were badly 
affected by the land issue and the ensuing famine of 1988 and1989 were dissatisfied. The 
peasants who lived in the badly affected southern areas saw that the government, which 
paid more attention to the northern region where Habyarimana and his political elites 
originated, marginalizing them. 401 Second, the government failed to address this 
dissatisfaction seriously and did not consider suggestions from the grass-root level.402  
Third, a lack of national debate led the southern elites to organize the peasants to support 
opposition movements.403  
Three set of events led to the genocide. First, the RPF’s leaders assessed the 
period of decline of Habyarimana regime’s legitimacy due to its inability to address the 
issue of refugees, poverty, famine and rising voices of opposition groups, as an 
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appropriate time to renew their rebellion. 404 Second, the ensuing war displaced up to one 
million inhabitants from the north, disrupted agricultural production, increasing scarcity, 
and sharpened the ethnicity divide and hatred (since RPF was associated with Tutsi).405 
Finally, the extremists manipulated this boiling situation by turning it into genocide in an 
attempt to salvage their remaining power structure.406    
Based on this analysis, I believe that Gasana acknowledges a significant role of 
environmental scarcities in the Rwandan conflict. His soft-Malthusian approach407 in 
explaining the genocide does not differ much from the attempt set by Prunier and Uvin. 
These explanations are more plausible in debunking the role of environmental scarcity in 
generating the genocide in Rwanda.               
On the same line, Hoyweghen argues that the economic gains especially in the 
form of land seizures have always been the motivation for many participants of the 
genocidal campaign. 408 In an economy in which access to non-agrarian sources of 
income is very limited, land has invariably become the scarce production factor.409  
 As a result, this resource scarcity pressured the population that was dependent on 
a single source of income. However, that pressure alone would not be a sufficient factor 
to initiate a violent conflict. According to Collier, “The willingness of young men to join 
a rebellion might be influenced by their income-earning opportunities. If young men face 
only the option of poverty, they might be inclined to join a rebellion than if they had 
better opportunities.”410 An insidious education policy coupled with dependency on 
limited income opportunities created a hostile situation within the population. It only 
needed an evil and determined organization that could manipulate the situation to plan 
and to execute the genocide using all the available “effects” that had culminated from the 
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legacy of indirect rule championed by the colonizer and totalitarian rule of Kayibanda 
and later on, the Habyarimana regimes.411 
In summary increasing land scarcity and a rapid population growth extremely 
affected the well-being of Rwandan societies. In the past, Rwandan farmers always had a 
choice to relocate to other areas of the country in response to the growing demographic 
pressure. The launching of the paysannat scheme in Rwanda was to some extent a 
reaction against land scarcity and a rising population. It was a well- intended project but 
provided only a temporary solution to the growing twin problems. Once there were no 
more unoccupied lands, farmers had to continue to cultivate the same holdings in an 
increasingly intensive manner year after year in order to sustain their livelihood. 
Compounded to these problems, farms were shrinking in size, as farmers had to 
subdivide their meager holdings equally among their sons.  
Since Rwanda’s strategy of agricultural development emphasized a subsistence 
agriculture (food self-sufficiency), a level of surplus production remained marginal and 
could not be used effectively to sustain a growing population. Dependency on cash crops, 
such as coffee or cotton, rendered the economy subjective to the fluctuation of the 
market. In retrospect, the Rwandan farmers could accrue higher incomes by diversifying 
their farm produce to include high-valued products, such as flowers and vegetables that 
had a good export potential. 412 
A problematic policy that was followed by the pre-genocide government revolved 
around limiting the opportunities of the Rwandan for other types of employment. 
Basically there were only two types of employment opened to the Rwandans: 
governmental jobs or working on the farms. Clinging to the ideology that “Hutus holy 
way of life is farming,” the government did not pursue a strategic policy of diversifying 
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the non-agricultural opportunities in an environment where there existed an extremely 
high pressure on land resources. 
Certainly, the “successful execution” of the genocide in 1994 had much to do with 
the readily available unemployed, landless people especially the youth who saw the 
elimination of Tutsis as a way to freed up more land for their usage apart from carrying 
out their duties against the “RPF collaborators.” 
On the other hand, nothing much has changed after the genocide. The intense 
demand for land is still the subject of conflict among the Rwandans. The imidugudu 
policy carried out by the government was well- intended but failed to perceive the 
difficulties that would be suffered by the affected individuals. Likely, this will become a 









































V.  THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COHESION 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the economic crisis that hit Southeast Asia in July 1997, many Asian 
governments were lulled into the impression that their top-down approach in fostering 
social cohesion and social stability had led to rapid development for three decades since 
the 1960s.413 These governments developed overarching “vision documents”414 that 
served as a rallying point around which the citizens were invited to focus their energies in 
achieving the goal.415 These visions facilitated social cohesion since they promoted the 
feature of “togetherness.”416  
Unfortunately, the economic crisis in 1997 quickly weakened social cohesion and 
resulted in a socia l conflict that arose from the ethnicity and class issues that had been 
lying dormant while the economic was booming.417 In the case of Rwanda, this conflict 
took a vicious twist. The vertical social cohesion that was fostered by the government for 
almost three decades was manipulated diligently in executing the genocide. Under such a 
situation, the power of social cohesion can clearly become a blessing or a curse. 
Since the exact meaning of social cohesion remains vague, I will examine some of 
the definitions that sociologists have put forward in entangling the issue.  
Stanley defines social cohesion as “the willingness of members of a society to 
cooperate with each other in order to survive and prosper.”418  This definition is very 
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normative and it does not take into account the existence of vertical control that 
influences a society.  A broader understanding of social cohesion was advanced by the 
World Bank encompass both the positive and negative aspects by including vertical as 
well as horizontal relations within a community and between the people and the 
institutions.419 
On the other hand, Moody and White propose that social cohesion or solidarity to 
be partitioned into an “ideational component” and “relational component.”420 Ideational 
component refers to “members’ identification with a collectivity,” while relational 
component refers to “the observed connections among members of the collectivity.”421  
Using this concept they believe that it is easier to identify analytically the relation 
between the community actors even though this does not negate the possibility that one 
component will reinforce the other.  
Colletta and Cullen assert that social cohesion can be measured “by the density 
and nature of organization and networks (both vertical and horizontal) and by members’ 
sense of commitment and responsibility to these groups.”422 They understand that 
cohesiveness of a society was founded on the basis of trust, which leads to the ability for 
cooperation and mutual exchange for material, labor and information. 423 The problem 
with trust, regarding vertical social cohesion, is that the higher levels of trust can make 
the conflict more violent since the rival ethnic group is more susceptible to unexpected 
attacks.424 In their investigation, Bhavani and Backer find that there were many examples 
that illustrate how the Tutsi “trusting” the Hutu in ways that facilitated the genocidal 
killings in 1994.425  
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To examine the problem of social cohesion with respect to the Rwandan tragedy I 
believe it is necessary to investigate how vertical and horizontal cohesiveness were 
developed within the Rwandan society in the pre-Genocide period. Subsequently, I will 
also examine how the authorities manipulated this cohesion to pursue their genocide 
agenda. Since the genocide enormously damaged the Rwandan society, destroying the 
social trust that bonded the Rwandan community, I will investigate how the post 
genocide government responds in facing a demanding challenge to calm the community 
actors who are ripe with hatred, suspicious, disillusionment, desire for revenge, and 
pessimistic about the future.426 
 
B. PRE-INDEPENDENCE SITUATION 
The social pattern of Rwandan population was very much influenced by the 
geographical condition in which they lived.  Most of the people live on musozi (hills) and 
consequently the hilly terrain of Rwanda was dotted with houses and farms and only 
broken by odd clumps of trees.427 Each peasant was a man of the rugo, which meant he 
had a family enclosure or compound around which all life revolved.428 Rugo  was a basic 
unit of social life and several rugos were interconnected into ingo based on lineage.429 
Since the lineage head held control over the land, any individual from another kin group 
who needed land might request a plot from the lineage head, and when granted, the 
recipient would become a land client of the donor lineage.430 In return he would repay 
the lineage head from time to time in the form of farm products or sometimes labor.431 
This was a very basic existence of social cohesion in which both parties performed their 
parts to achieve a mutual benefit. Another mechanism of fostering social cohesion was 
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the ubuhake system that had been described earlier, which worked in the form of charity. 
Every hill was dotted with dozens of ingos, and consequently the Tutsi and Hutu lived 
side by side in neighboring ingo, on the same hilly slopes.432  In terms of a relational 
component of social cohesion, these communities were very cohesive due to the dense 
connection among the members, and they knew each other very well. 
When the Mwami extended his control over the population, he sent his chiefs to 
administer the musozi.  The chiefs set certain norms for the musozi as a way to fulfill the 
obligation and to pay the taxes to the government.433  Neither these obligations nor the 
taxes rested on individuals separately but within each rugo (household). The people made 
their own arrangements to fulfill the government’s order.434 This enforced the social 
cohesivesness within the community and acted as a mechanism in which people helped 
each other in order to survive and to prosper.  
Another mechanism that maintained social cohesion within this traditional society 
was the gacaca court. This conflict resolution mechanism was built on one essential 
precondition: mutual trust. It worked on the basis that the conflicting parties trusted the 
older men who were respected in their community to “impart impartially, with sincerity, 
wisely, honestly, and freely without benefiting themselves.”435 On the other hand, both 
parties were trusted to deliver the truth in their claims. 
In the late nineteenth century, a new form of compulsory work known as 
ubureetwa was introduced. An individual would labor at public work once every two 
months.436 This mechanism was flexible and was also looked upon as a community 
obligation. 
During the Belgian colonial period, the system was excessively tightened, so 
taxes were a responsibility of every individual instead of the softer collective 
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responsibility approach that had been practiced before.437 Ubureetwa was also abused. 
Men were expected to perform ubureetwa work for two to three full days a week.438 This 
looked more like a forced labor system since an ingo could no longer delegate a strong 
man among them to perform the job since every single man and sometimes women and 
children too had to go and perform the public work.439 Thus this form of social obligation 
was devoid of social cohesion and much more disliked by the people than the traditional 
form of taxation. 440 The effects of the colonial policy also fostered the cohesion within 
the oppressed Hutu population while fragmenting the relations between the Hutu and 
Tutsi. The relational component of social cohesion across the community still existed 
since physically they still living close to one another. 
 
C. POST-INDEPENDENCE SITUATION TO PRE-GENOCIDE PERIOD 
The Hutu elite led by Kayibanda, who gained power in 1961 and retained it after 
the independence in 1962, embarked on a policy that completed the destruction of 
traditional social cohesion that existed during the pre-colonial period. Traditional 
political and social systems such as the gacaca conflict resolution mechanism and the 
role of elders were replaced by a central administration. Kayibanda adopted a style of 
governance that was highly authoritarian and continued to reinforce a culture of 
obedience that provided an enabling environment in subsequent years for the continued 
persecution of the Tutsi. 441 Horizontal cohesion between Hutu and Tutsi worsened with 
increasing government repression against the Tutsi that mainly characterized the pattern 
of Kayibanda’s administration until he was replaced by Habyarimana. 
After taking power from Kayibanda, Habyarimana lessened the repression against 
the Tutsi and tried to rebuild a better Rwanda. In order to foster social cohesion in 
communes that were rife with suspicion and devoid of collective spirit due to the Hutu 
revolution and Kayibanda’s policy, Habyarimana government introduced umuganda, 
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which was a system of obligatory communal labor.442 Weekly umuganda worked on a 
neighborhood basis and it was the government’s attempt to foster the spirit of local 
cooperation and goodwill.443 Apart from being used as a mechanism to organize 
communal labor, umuganda sessions were also filled with activities that attracted the 
community like the “animation,” including dancing, praising for the regime and its 
leaders and a great deal of collective chanting and clapping. 444 Hence umuganda was a 
powerful community building exercise and it encompassed building horizontal and 
vertical social cohesion. 
Even though the quota for the Tutsi remained enforced within the public office or 
official state administration, they were allowed more freedom in private business 
sector.445 Tutsi businessmen were able to prosper and to develop good relations with 
senior members of the government, including President Habyarimana himself.446 As long 
as the Tutsi stayed away from the political arena, they were fairly accepted as part of the 
society. 
The early years of Habyarimana’s regime saw impressive macro-economic 
growth.447 Before the mid-1980s, the government had avoided becoming heavily 
indebted, while the level of inflation and corruption was very low. 448 The services that 
were provided to the population in terms of drinking water, electricity, primary 
education, health care, and networks of road were very impressive.449  This outward 
appearance of order and growth brought significant technical and financial support from 
the major western country donors and the World Bank, who disregarded the issue of the 
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prevailing socio-cultural ideology. 450 Rwanda during this time was regarded as “an 
outstanding example of orderly, well-organized and honestly administered development” 
and was well known as the “Switzerland of Africa.”451 To a general observer, only a 
cohesive society could achieve a success as in Rwanda. 
On the other hand, Habyarimana also had succeeded in extending his control to 
the lowest level of the Rwandan society.  The single party system (MRND) that he 
institutionalized in 1978 was used as a mechanism to build a strong vertical cohesiveness 
between the masses and the administrators. As had been shaped during the aristocratic 
and colonial rule, Rwandan individuals continued to demonstrate a remarkable degree of 
internalized social control in relation to their superiors452 while the administrators, down 
to the village level, were selected from among the party cadres in order to ensure a 
“oneness” of his vision. 
In furthering his agenda to keep the Rwandans from being actively involved in 
politics (hence strengthened his power), MRND was portrayed as an administrative 
apparatus and not a political party. In an agrarian community like Rwanda it was easier 
for Habyarimana to urge and to encourage the populace to devote entirely to the business 
of agriculture and leave politics on his shoulder.453 Thus a culture of obedience to the 
state by the masses was instilled throughout his regime’s period. As long as the economy 
of the country prospered, there was no concern among the population to scrutinize his 
policy. 
The economic crisis that I discussed in the previous section and the ensuing 
ravaging famine in 1988 to 1989, weakened the legitimacy of the Habyarimana regime 
since he was not able to address the problem effectively. As Rwanda’s trade deficit 
accumulated, the existing redistributional and welfare policy that had flowered during the 
early years of his regime came under increasing pressure to be changed.454 These policies 
                                                 
450 Greg Duly, “Creating a Violence-Free Society: The Case for Rwanda,” The Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance (2000): 9. 
451 Helen M.Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 37.2 (1999): 244 
452 Ibid., 248 
453 Greg Duly, “Creating a Vio lence-Free Society: The Case for Rwanda,” The Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance (2000): 9. 
454 Helen M.Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 37.2 (1999): 248 
94 
had been based “on the construction of social cohesion among Hutu through the 
imposition of ethnic quotas, and a high degree of economic control of producers and 
pricing.”455 Unable to salvage the economy successfully, Habyarimana turned to the old 
strategy of pointing the blame to what he called the “conspiracy of parasitic traders, 
merchants and intellectuals,” professions in which Tutsi tended to specialize.456 
Whatever rhetoric Habyarimana employed, the level of dissatisfaction among the 
peasants grew since there was a lack of free debate on the appropriate response that 
should be taken. Perhaps at this stage the cohesiveness of the Rwanda socie ty was at the 
verge and animosity between the people and the administrators was on the rise. 
Coincidently the RPF renewed a war against the government in response to the failure of 
the government to address the issue of refugees. This war as had been discussed before 
displaced around one million inhabitants, and this caused grievances and strong anti-
rebellion sentiment among the Rwandans. In turn, Habyarimana seized this tense 
situation to recreate the propaganda on the perceived “Tutsi threat” as a moved to salvage 
his remaining power.457 Brown is correct when he states that hostilities can be escalated 
due to the existence of “antagonistic group histories and mounting economic 
problems.”458 
At the same time, something new emerged as a direct result of the war with RPF: 
a militarization of Rwandan state expenditure, growing corruption among the political 
elite and a rapid para-militarization of Rwandan society. 459 Facing the war and the 
growing voices of oppositions, Habyarimana oversaw the creation of hundreds of civil 
defense associations and covert death squads, all dedicated to fighting the RPF and “their 
allies.”460 Covert actions were an important dimension of Habyarimana regime’s close 
political control and were especially effective in highly stratified socie ty.461  Hintjens 
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describe the atmosphere vividly, “a strong sense of secrecy and a false air of normality 
served to disarm many victims of this genocide … many Tutsi apparently failed to 
anticipate the genocide, in spite of mounting evidence that something [sinister] was being 
planned.”462 
 
D. GENOCIDE PERIOD 
In many ways the creation of Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi as youth wings 
of MRND party was a strategy used by Habyraimana to build cohesiveness among the 
Hutu extremist.  This notion can be verified by the meaning of both movements in the 
Kinyarwandan language. In Kinyarwanda,  Interahamwe means “those who attached 
together” and Impuzamugambi means “those who have the same goal” or “single-minded 
ones.”463 These movements bonded together the unemployed, uneducated Hutu youth to 
pursue a single objective that is the preservation of “Hutu power.” Colleta and Cullen 
noted this in their research by their statement, “Of the nearly 60 percent of the Rwandan 
population under age 20, few had hopes of obtaining land and jobs. This bleak reality 
facilitated the recruitment of Hutu and their acceptance of Tutsi hate propaganda.”464 At 
this stage, the situation was already ripe for the Hutu extremists within the government to 
set the plan to exterminate all Tutsi or dealt with the “Tutsi threat” once and for all. 
When the call for “Let us do the work” began, the “Genocidaires were united by 
the collective action of killing, which helped created feelings of collective consiousness, 
commonality, shared goals, and solidarity … The manipulation of fear and hatred against 
Tutsi created solidarity among Hutu.”465 The calls to inspire all the Hutu to participate in 
the genocide were passed down to the lowest rank of the Hutu population via the 
administrative network that had been established by Habyarimana and through the 
notorious RTLMC (Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines) radio that continuously 
broadcast the anti-Tutsi feelings. The concept of umuganda was also manipulated to 
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gather ordinary Hutu peasants support in carrying out  the genocide. The killings were 
legitimized by the interim government led by Jean Kambanda by the calls such as “Let’s 
clear the bush,” which meant killing the inyenzi and the Tutsi. 
Prunier contends that the efficiency of the genocide was attributed to the quality 
and responsibility of Rwandan local administrator, which was a manifestation of 
historical strength of the central government.466 This was enforced by the civilians’ sense 
of civic duty to fulfill orders delivered to them. Consequently, vertical social 
cohesiveness, which was manifested as an absolute state power, penetrated the Rwandan 
society so deeply that it took precedence over horizontal relations and loyalties. Colleta 
and Cullen also noted this in their research, “Officials from the police, local 
administrators, and military forces went door to door requisitioning men to partake in 
their “national duty” of eliminating Tutsi, and Hutu voluntarily or begrudgingly followed 
these orders. Killing Tutsi was portrayed as a Hutu civic duty; such phrases as “do your 
work” or “it is your duty to help clear the field” that meant eradicate the inyenzi 
(cockroaches, meaning Tutsi) were current.”467 
Up to this stage, I illustrated the role of vertical and horizontal cohesiveness of the 
Hutu in perpetrating the massacres against their Tutsi country men and women. The 
element of social cohesion actually played a double edge sword in this tragedy. The Tutsi 
who trusted their Hutu administrators or neighbors were caught by surprise when their 
trust backfired while the cohesion within the Hutu enabled the genocide to spread at an 
extreme rate. 
 
E. POST-GENOCIDE PERIOD 
As a mean to facilitate community reintegration and horizontal social cohesion in 
a society that was traumatized by unimaginable violence, the new government of Rwanda 
with the assistance of the UNDP and the World Bank embarked on a strategy of 
decentralization in which communes would plan and implement their own development 
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projects.468 This decentralization policy that would dismantle the legacy of strong 
vertical cohesion provided an avenue for the people to experience a culture of open 
debate in which ideas were debated rather than passively accepted, as had been the norms 
during the pre-genocide era.469  
This strategy was implemented by the use of Participatory Rural Appraisals 
(PRAs) where community members were free to express their views regarding 
development program that should be prioritized and suitable for local needs.470 The 
World Bank provided the PRAs with technical assistance and local consultants in order to 
coordinate the effort.471 The Rwandan Ministry of Interior set up two bodies in realizing 
the community development program.472 They were the Community Development 
Committee (CDCs) at the commune level that acted as the project’s decision making 
bodies and the Project Coordination Management Unit (PCMU) that coordinated projects 
at the national level. 473 The PCMU would contract with local consultant to build the PRA 
and inform communities of project opportunities.474 In turn the PRA assisted the CDCs 
to develop and finalize Community Development Plans.475 To qualify for World Bank 
and UNDP support, CDPs had to adhere to specific principles that were seen as the pillars 
to foster horizontal social cohesion and implement decentralization. 476 The five 
principles were 
· The project cycle must maximize grassroots participation and input.  
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· At the communal level, the development plans must encourage trust 
building through community-based reintegration and development 
activities while increasing conflict resolution capacity.  
· The CDPs must be seen as a way to enhance the opportunities for self-
reliance of vulnerable populations and communities. 
· The CDPs must strengthen local capacity to implement reintegration and 
development activities.  
· The CDPs must promote protection of the disadvantage groups (widows, 
female headed household, orphans and the disabled) in decision-
making.477 
In a nutshell, this initiative attempted to use a novel and promising approach that 
built partnerships between local populations and local administrations in a way that 
would enhance ownership of development.478 Since the project paid great attention to 
instilling the skills for conflict resolution and consensus building, this had an immediate 
effect of rebuilding ideational and relational social cohesion that had been destroyed by 
the genocide. 
Another important effort that had been made in the reconstruction of social 
cohesion was the establishment of an effective and fair mass media.479 This was meant to 
linking Hutu and Tutsi once again in a cohesive Rwandan identity and also held the 
government accountable for their policy. 480 
The new Rwandan government led by Kagame is also embarking on the vision of 
2020, which seeks to turn the country into a reasonable prosperous and emergent 
economy by the year 2020.481 Understandably, the government always stresses the policy 
of “there are no more Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, only Rwandans.” 
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It is evident that traditional Rwandan society was fairly cohesive and the mutual 
relation among the inhabitant characterized their interaction. Vertical social cohesion 
started to grow when Mwami extended his control over the population. This positive 
vertical and horizontal social cohesion that existed prior to the colonial period was 
fostered through many mechanisms, such as the mechanism to obtain a plot of land, the 
ubuhake, ubureetwa, and gacaca system of conflict resolution. During the colonial 
period, the horizontal relationship between Hutu and Tusti was damaged through various 
colonial administrative policies that favored one group over the other. 
The initial post- independence period saw horizontal cohesion between Hutu and 
Tusti, which continued to be disturbed by the Kayibanda government’s policy. 
Traditional societal mechanisms that survived the colonial period were replaced by 
authoritarian rule. The Habyarimana government performed well during the early period 
of his regime while the economy was booming. Society looked very cohesive and in 
many aspects it enjoyed the benefits that Southeast Asian countries were experiencing. 
As long as the economy was good, people could live harmoniously and the unsolved 
issue of ethnicity and class remained dormant. Unfortunately, dependency on limited 
resources of income rendered Rwanda vulnerable to an economic downturn. When it 
happened, the consequence was disastrous due to the inability of the Habyarimana 
government to handle the situation wisely. He placed his objective of salvaging his power 
ahead of the future of Rwanda.  
The genocide that happened after the culmination of many events illustrated that 
social cohesion can appear during the conflict. Apart from uniting the extremist Hutu 
together to carry out “the duty,” the vertical and horizontal social cohesion within the 
Hutu group that had been fostered during the pre-genocide period made the execution of 
the genocide easier. The Tutsi could not escape the deadly trap of living in Rwanda since 
the Hutu knew them very well. This was evident by the pre-genocide situation that I 
depicted earlier. Prunier states it clearly, “In the countryside, where people knew each 
other well, identifying the Tutsi was easy and they had absolutely no chance of escaping. 
Since Hutu and Tutsi are not tribes but social groups within the same culture, there was 
no separate dwelling pattern. They lived side by side in similar huts, and given the 
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demographic ratio, each Tutsi [rugo] was usually surrounded by several Hutu families 
[rugos], making concealment almost impossible … The “small Tutsi” from the Hills were 
in no way different from their Hutu neighbors, except perhaps in their physical 
appearance. But it did not matter because the Tutsi or Hutu identities of villagers were 
public knowledge.”482 
This demonstrates that the ability for a community to live together does not 
necessarily indicate a stable society. Despite their calmness and innocent appearance, the 
underlying fears of each community member which in this case was built on the 
foundation of hatred towards the others and being re-imposed successively placed the 
society in a flimsy situation of being demolished at any instant when the “fear” was 
translated into violence. 
The post-genocide government of Rwanda, named itself the Government of 
National Unity. The name alone shows that social defragmentation should not be allowed 
to happen again in Rwanda.  The government totally ascribes to the concept of 
decentralization and this seems to be the aspect that governs many of its policy. The 
obvious advantage of decentralization is that the negative aspect of vertical cohesion in 
terms of blind obedience has ended and a more vocal society will appear.  This bottom-up 
approach in community building will hopefully generate a society that has a sense of 
belonging. It also fosters an openness among the citizens that will lead to a more cohesive 
relationship. 
On the other hand, to take at face value or deny the existence of Hutu and Tutsi 
identities, as malleable as they are, seems to repeat the failure of the past. The situation 
can be under controlled as long as the government or the economy is strong, but that is 
not the normal cycle of this world. Perhaps the best approach that should be taken is for 
each group to acknowledge their existence and foster an understanding without any 
historical bias or political agenda. 
 
 
                                                 





The Tutsis who perished in the genocide did not choose to be born as Tutsi. The 
Hutus who are languishing in the jails waiting for the trials also did not choose to be born 
as Hutu. Mankind being composed of different races and must learn to coexist peacefully. 
The ability to coexist in harmony has very much to do with our perceptions and the 
prejudices of our forefathers.  
In any given society, the public perception of certain matters can be shaped 
through education, the mass media, inter-generational transfers of knowledge and 
socialization. Fundamental to the use of any educational materials should be their 
appropriateness in facilitating an individual’s understanding of social relations and the 
ability to live in a changing society. It is also recognized that the mass media can quickly 
become an apparatus for indoctrination.  
This thesis showed that Rwanda’s decent into genocide was fostered through 
educational and the mass media.  Since throughout the conflict the government held the 
reins of both of these instruments, it shaped and manifested the Hutu-Tutsi antipathy. On 
the other hand, one must remember that the people in the power structure were the 
Rwandan bred who had the opportunity to obtain the highest level of education available. 
Thus there existed an interlocking mechanism—the educated had been victims of 
indoctrination. They in turn, became the power holders who perpetuated the bigotry and 
eventual genocide. The education system in Rwanda since its independence was very 
centralized and an admission for higher schooling was based on ethnicity. Coupled with 
the government’s policy to maintain the economy mostly based on agricultural products 
(coffee, tea and cotton) while advocating the ideology of “Hutu’s holy way of life is 
farming,” the education system was not designed to prepare the majority population for 
other types of employment. Perhaps future research could concentrate on finding more 
detailed evidence in the contents of the education curriculum through out the pre-
genocide period that might display these patterns. 
Pre-genocide Rwanda was characterized by a situation in which the population 
kept increasing while soil fertility was decreasing. Eventually, cultivable land became a 
scarce resource that ultimately increased the tension between struggling farmers. Refugee 
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issues and civil war only increased the social tension. For the Hutus who occupied the 
land left by the refugees there was a constant fear that they would lose the land if the 
refugees were allowed to return. The civil war massively displaced northern Hutus who 
fled to the south and lost their livelihood and descended into poverty.  
Against this backdrop, the extremist forces were able to exploit the existing ethnic 
cleavages and historical animosities between the Hutu and Tutsi in order to foster 
horizontal cohesiveness between the majority Hutu in perpetrating the genocide. This was 
reinforced by the existing vertical cohesiveness between the masses and the 
administrators. The extremist forces cunningly manipulated the available mechanisms 
within the Rwandan community to promote the genocide. They further exploited the 
international community by killing peacekeeping personnel to ensure the “successful” 
execution of the genocide outside of international purview. If any accident is a 
culmination of a chain of incidents, it is true of the genocide in Rwanda. With hindsight, 
the genocide in 1994 might not have happened if one of the aforementioned factors was 
mitigated. If humanity is to learn a lesson from the Rwandan tragedy, it is important for 
any “conflict prone society” to look back and understand the overall impact of any policy 
that is implemented.  
The problem with many developing countries is that the ethnic and racial issues 
spill into the education system. An indicator of ethnic or racial issues is the existence of a 
quota system based on ethnicity or race for pursuing higher education. Such a system 
creates tensions and breeds racial or ethnic biases in the minds of the students who are 
supposed to be the future human capital of the state. Hence, policy makers should be 
prudent in designing an education policy so that it fosters national unity and 
reconciliation in any post-conflict society. Entrance into higher education should be 
based on merit and decentralizing the education administration may prevent the 
curriculum from being politicized. Decentralization may also limit the influence of the 
center on the educational operations of local governments. By having the community 
involved in the school’s administration, positive values can be advanced within and 
outside the schools. To sustain schools financially, a collaborative effort should be 
established through a mix of public financing, investment from the private sectors, 
foreign assistance, and contribution from firms, associations and individuals. These 
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various actors should be made to understand that they have a stake in the education 
system. 
Policy makers should also view education as a national investment. There is no 
doubt that education is a factor in human capital formation and thus it is an important 
ingredient of economic growth and social development.483 Therefore the education 
system must be designed in such a way that it will inspire people to seek progress.484All 
education levels, if designed on a sound basis, can contribute directly to economic growth 
by creating human capital essential for any kind of production. In this process of creating 
human capital, the contribution of elementary education should not be undermined since 
it forms the foundation of all subsequent education. At the very early stage of 
development, the children should be taught the civic values that will be the foundation of 
civil society. An effective and fair mass media can reinforce these values. 
Moreover, in a densely populated country like Rwanda, economic planners should 
also recognize how education promotes economic growth. This can shift the current 
tendency from relying on limited agricultural and manufacturing products. This can be 
achieved if the economy is diversified and if public education produces the necessary 
manpower. Increasing educated populations should be viewed as a catalyst for growth 
since it increases demand and thus stimulates investment. 
Policy makers should also recognize that building stronger, more resilient 
societies is as important as reengineering economic growth. This can be achieved by 
fostering civic engagement in community building and cooperative problem solving, 
which eventually will creates social trust, cooperation, reciprocity and inclusion. The 
imidugudu policy that is being implemented by the present Rwandan government is 
looked upon as a practical way to rebuild the shattered community and to solve the land 
issue. However because various problems arose from its implementation, further research 
might verify whether this policy can be a source of future conflict.  
A more prudent approach to solve the refugee and land claim issues must be 
taken. The government should establish a court that can settle this problem wisely. Apart 
from trying  those involved with genocide, the gacaca court could also settle the 
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contention of the various land claimants. If the economic system is redesigned to generate 
various sources of employment for Rwandans, land pressure could be addressed if there 
is an element of transparency and community participation in the reallocation process.   
The strategy that was designed by the World Bank and UNDP to decentralize 
community projects and to establish mechanisms that build horizontal social cohesion 
among Rwandans deserve praise. Implementing projects will be more practical if the 
process involves maximum participation from the grassroots levels. Developers will be 
able to understand the real problems and the needs of the community. By building a 
partnership between the local population and local administrators, it is hoped that a sense 
of ownership of the development can be enhanced. 
Understanding that reconciliation will take a long time, the government must take 
enormous efforts to reduce the tension. Recently, the presidential election showed that the 
ethnicity issue still lingers among the Rwandans. Thus a fair and effective mass media 
can play an important role in reconstructing the social cohesion between the Hutu and 
Tutsi and can function as a watch-dog in the implementation of government policy. Even 
if the government embarks on a policy to refer to all its people as Rwandans, no more 
Hutu and Tutsi, it is wiser if the ethnicity is not denied and mutual respect is inculcated in 
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